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This Article examines permissive rules of professional conduct—that is, rules providing that lawyers “may” engage in
particular conduct—and the implications of these rules for
other law governing lawyers. One might assume that, when a
professional code explicitly authorizes lawyers to engage in certain behavior, the drafters made a normative judgment that
the best way to regulate the conduct covered by the rule is to
let lawyers determine how to act as a matter of individual discretion. One might also take the view that this normative
judgment is worthy of respect and that other lawmakers should
not encroach on the discretion accorded by the rules. This Article calls that view into question. It demonstrates that permissive aspects of the professional codes may be more limited than
readily apparent and that, even when the code drafters intend
to relegate issues to lawyers’ discretion, their justifications for
according discretion often leave room for external constraints.
Lawyers are regulated by court-adopted disciplinary rules
and other law, including civil liability standards,1 civil statutes
and regulations,2 and criminal law.3 There is a robust body of
1. See generally 1 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY E. SMITH, LEGAL MALpt. III (5th ed. 2005) (describing theories of liability for legal professionals).
2. For example, the IRS has adopted rules for federal tax practitioners,
e.g., Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, 31 C.F.R. pt. 10 (2006), the
SEC has adopted rules for securities lawyers, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002), and the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office has adopted rules for patent and trademark lawyers, e.g., Changes to
the Representation of Others Before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 69
Fed. Reg. 35,428 (June 24, 2004) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pts. 1, 10, 11).
3. See generally Bruce A. Green, The Criminal Regulation of Lawyers, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 327 (1998) (discussing criminal prosecutions of lawyers);
Charles W. Wolfram, Lawyer Crimes: Beyond the Law?, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 73
(2001) (same).
PRACTICE
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academic and professional literature on the interrelationship
between the disciplinary rules—which typically are modeled on
the American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct4—and the other law governing lawyers.5 External law plainly influences the legal ethics codes; code drafters6
routinely incorporate legal standards into the professional
rules7 and rely upon the effects of extra-code constraints to
supplement the codes’ effects.8 The influence of the ethics codes
on external law, however, is less plain.

4. For the most part, this Article uses the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) and the ABA’s Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Model Code) as illustrations of disciplinary rules. Neither the
Model Rules nor the Model Code has legal force. However, prior to the adoption of the Model Rules in 1983, most states based their disciplinary rules on
the Model Code and, since then, the majority of states have based their disciplinary rules on some version of the Model Rules. The Model Rules were comprehensively amended in 2002, and many states have either amended their
codes in light of the changes or have begun examining their codes with an eye
to doing so. On one issue important to this Article—the circumstances under
which lawyers may disclose client confidences to avert harm to third parties—
there is significant state variation. See infra note 80.
5. See, e.g., David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV.
L. REV. 799 (1992) (discussing the interplay of the various forms of regulation).
6. By “code drafters,” this Article refers to all of the various participants
in promulgating the professional rules. With respect to the ABA Model Code
and ABA Model Rules, this includes the reporters, their committees, task
forces, and advisors, and the ABA House of Delegates which adopts the rules.
Each state employs its own set of drafters who help the state’s highest court
determine which rules to adopt.
7. General principles of agency, fiduciary, criminal, and evidentiary law
support many of the codes’ provisions. Some rules refer specifically to external
law. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d), 1.6(b)(6), 1.16(c), 4.1,
5.5, 8.4(b)–(c) (2006).
8. See Green, supra note 3, at 330 (discussing criminal prosecutions for
conduct that also violates the ethics codes); Wolfram, supra note 3, at 75 (discussing criminal prosecutions of lawyers); Fred C. Zacharias, The Future
Structure and Regulation of Law Practice: Confronting Lies, Fictions, and
False Paradigms in Legal Ethics Regulation, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 829, 867 (2002)
(discussing the interrelationship between ethics codes and civil liability standards); Fred C. Zacharias, The Purposes of Lawyer Discipline, 45 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 675, 687 (2003) (“[T]he disciplinary system relies upon criminal and
civil remedies to provide supplemental implementation of its goals.”); Fred C.
Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes: Theory, Practice,
and the Paradigm of Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 223, 233
(1993) [hereinafter Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Codes] (“[T]he codes
rely on noncode constraints to limit and punish misconduct . . . .”); Fred C.
Zacharias, Understanding Recent Trends in Federal Regulation of Lawyers,
PROF. LAW., 2003 Symposium Issue, at 15, 15–22 [hereinafter Zacharias, Understanding Recent Trends] (discussing federal administrative regulation of
lawyer conduct).
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Much of the literature on the extra-disciplinary significance of ethics codes focuses on whether mandatory rules (i.e.,
rules that require or prohibit particular conduct) should be enforced outside the disciplinary context—for example, whether
they should serve as the standard of civil liability for professional negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, or fraud;9 whether
they should be used in judicial proceedings as the basis of litigation sanctions10 or disqualification;11 and whether they may
form the basis for criminal liability.12 On this issue, the ABA
drafters themselves have taken a modest approach. For a long
9. Compare Stephen E. Kalish, How to Encourage Lawyers to Be Ethical:
Do Not Use the Ethics Codes as a Basis for Regular Law Decisions, 13 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 649, 668–69 (2000) (arguing that ethics law and regular law
“should be separate”), Daniel Engelman, Comment, The Rules of Professional
Conduct and Civil Liability of Attorneys, 1993 DETROIT C. L. REV. 915, 947
(1993) (arguing that the Rules are not too vague to define the standard of care
and that the Rules’ standard of care is much less ambiguous than the common
law standard of the “reasonable” lawyer), and David J. Fish, Comment, The
Use of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct to Establish the Standard of
Care in Attorney Malpractice Litigation: An Illogical Practice, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J.
65, 80 (1998) (arguing that the Rules, which were not enacted by the legislature and therefore are not statutory in nature, should not be the basis for civil
liability), with Gary A. Munneke & Anthony E. Davis, The Standard of Care in
Legal Malpractice: Do the Model Rules of Professional Conduct Define It?, 22 J.
LEGAL PROF. 33, 83 (1998) (“[C]ase law outside the field of legal malpractice
demonstrates that courts consistently cite ethical rules to support decisions
that modify the standards of civil liability.”), and Charles W. Wolfram, The
Code of Professional Responsibility as a Measure of Attorney Liability in Civil
Litigation, 30 S.C. L. REV. 281, 283 (1979) (arguing for enforcement of ethics
codes in the civil liability context).
10. See, e.g., JUDITH A. MCMORROW & DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE, THE FEDERAL LAW OF ATTORNEY CONDUCT, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 809.01 (3d
ed. 1997) (explaining that when lawyers abuse the discovery process to the
point of unethical behavior, “courts frequently look to the principles and language of legal ethics . . . to determine whether to use their inherent power to
sanction the conduct at issue”).
11. Compare, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Conflicts of Interest in Litigation: The
Judicial Role, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 71, 73 (1996) (“[D]isqualification should
not be a per se remedy for a violation of a conflict rule and . . . , on the contrary, the court’s determination should not be based on the conflict rules at
all.”), with Susan R. Martyn, Developing the Judicial Role in Controlling Litigation Conflicts: Response to Green, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 131 passim (1996)
(arguing that removing the threat of disqualification would provide a greater
incentive for lawyers to bend or break the conflict of interest rules).
12. See Green, supra note 3, at 329–30 (discussing the application of
criminal law to lawyer misconduct); Peter J. Henning, Targeting Legal Advice,
54 AM. U. L. REV. 669, 690 (2005) (“If the ethics rules can form the basis of a
criminal prosecution, then the next step may be the pursuit of lawyers for
their representation of clients that, while not unethical, fails to prevent misconduct.”).
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time, their position was that the codes should play no role outside the disciplinary context13—a position that was at odds
with the widespread use of the codes in a variety of extradisciplinary settings. Currently, the drafters acknowledge that
ethics codes may have consequences outside the disciplinary
context, but insist that the professional rules are not drafted
with those consequences in mind.14
Comparatively little attention has been given to a separate
question about the extra-code influence of professional rules;
namely, whether provisions that accord lawyers choices regarding particular conduct should be respected by external lawmakers who might otherwise forbid or compel the conduct.
Unlike mandatory rules—which embody either obligations telling lawyers what they “must” or “shall” do or prohibitions telling lawyers what they “may not” or “shall not” do15—permissive

13. The ABA’s 1969 Model Code stated that it does not “undertake to define standards for civil liability of lawyers for professional conduct.” MODEL
CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY pmbl. (1969). Similarly, the pre-2002 versions of the ABA’s Model Rules claimed:
Violation of a Rule should not give rise to a cause of action nor should
it create any presumption that a legal duty has been breached. The
Rules are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a
structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. They
are not designed to be a basis for civil liability. Furthermore, the purpose of the Rules can be subverted when they are invoked by opposing
parties as procedural weapons. . . . Accordingly, nothing in the Rules
should be deemed to augment any substantive legal duty of lawyers
or the extra-disciplinary consequences of violating such a duty.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (1983).
14. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 20 (2006) (“Violation
of a Rule should not itself give rise to a cause of action against a lawyer nor
should it create any presumption in such a case that a legal duty has been
breached. In addition, violation of a Rule does not necessarily warrant any
other nondisciplinary remedy, such as disqualification of a lawyer in pending
litigation. . . . Nevertheless, since the Rules do establish standards of conduct
by lawyers, a lawyer’s violation of a Rule may be evidence of breach of the applicable standard of conduct.”).
15. See id. R. 1.2(a) (“[A] lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation . . . .”); id. R. 1.2(d) (“A lawyer shall not
counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows
is criminal or fraudulent . . . .”); id. R. 1.3 (“A lawyer shall act with reasonable
diligence and promptness in representing a client.”); id. R. 1.4(a)(3) (“A lawyer
shall keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter . . . .”);
id. R. 1.6(a) (“A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent . . . .”); cf. id. R. 6.1
(providing anomalously that lawyers “should aspire to render at least (50)
hours of pro bono publico legal services per year”).
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professional rules generally are “cast in the term ‘may.’”16 This
means, according to the ABA drafters, that they “define areas . . . in which the lawyer has discretion to exercise professional judgment.”17 Permissive aspects of the codes include
various exceptions to attorney-client confidentiality18 as well as
rules permitting lawyers to refrain from offering suspected perjury in a civil case,19 to charge a contingent fee in most types of
cases,20 to undertake certain conflicted representations upon
the client’s informed consent,21 and to withdraw from the representation under specified conditions.22
16. Id. pmbl. ¶ 14 (“Some of the Rules are imperatives, cast in the terms
of ‘shall’ or ‘shall not.’ . . . Others, generally cast in the term ‘may,’ are permissive and define areas under the Rules in which the lawyer has discretion to
exercise professional judgment. No disciplinary action should be taken when
the lawyer chooses not to act or acts within the bounds of such discretion.”).
17. Id. But see id. R. 1.6 cmt. 15 (noting that although Rule 1.6(b) “permits but does not require disclosure of ” client confidences in specified situations, “[d]isclosure may be required . . . by other Rules” in some circumstances
if Rule 1.6(b) permits disclosure, and in one circumstance regardless of
whether Rule 1.6(b) permits disclosure).
18. See id. R. 1.6(b) (setting forth exceptions to confidentiality).
19. See, e.g., id. R. 3.3(a)(3) (“A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence, other
than the testimony of a defendant in a criminal matter, that the lawyer reasonably believes is false.”).
20. See, e.g., id. R. 1.8(i)(2) (“[T]he lawyer may . . . contract with a client
for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case.”).
21. See, e.g., id. R. 1.7(b) (setting forth cases involving a concurrent conflict of interest in which a lawyer “may” accept the representation with a client’s informed consent).
22. See id. R. 1.16(b) (setting forth circumstances under which “a lawyer
may withdraw from representing a client”). Other provisions of the Model
Rules are also framed in permissive language. See id. R. 1.2(c) (“A lawyer may
limit the scope of the representation if the limitation is reasonable . . . .”); id.
R. 1.5(c) (stating that subject to limitations, “[a] fee may be contingent”); id.
R. 1.5(e) (detailing when lawyers from different firms may divide a fee); id.
R. 1.7(b) (“Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest . . . a lawyer may represent a client” under specified circumstances.); id.
R. 1.13(c) (“[I]f (1) . . . the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization insists upon or fails to address in a timely and appropriate manner
an action or a refusal to act, that is clearly a violation of law and (2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the violation is reasonably certain to result in
substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer may reveal information
relating to the representation . . . .”); id. R. 1.13(g) (allowing a lawyer representing an organization also to represent its members and constituents, subject to the conflict rule); id. R. 1.14(b) (allowing a lawyer to take protective action if his client either has diminished capacity or is at risk of imminent
harm); id. R. 1.14(c) (authorizing a lawyer to reveal information about a client
with diminished capacity to take protective action where reasonably necessary
to protect the client’s interests); id. R. 1.15(b) (“A lawyer may deposit the lawyer’s own funds in a client trust account for the sole purpose of paying bank
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Given the model code drafters’ professed indifference to the
disciplinary rules’ influence on other lawyer regulation, it
would seem peculiar for the bar to ask external lawmakers to
defer to the normative judgments underlying the codes’ permissive rules. But the profession has not been inhibited by the code
drafters’ position. Witness the ABA’s recent, and apparently
successful, opposition to a proposed reporting requirement
originally considered for inclusion in the Security and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) Sarbanes-Oxley regulations.23 The
service charges . . . .”); id. R. 1.17 (detailing when a lawyer may sell a law
practice); id. R. 2.3(a) (“A lawyer may provide an evaluation of a matter affecting a client for the use of someone other than the client if the lawyer reasonably believes that making the evaluation is compatible with other aspects of the
lawyer’s relationship with the client.”); id. R. 3.6(b)–(c) (enumerating what a
lawyer may state extra-judicially); id. R. 3.7(b) (allowing a lawyer to represent
a client when another lawyer in his firm may be called as a witness, unless
Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9 forbids it); id. R. 5.5(d) (“A lawyer admitted in another
United States jurisdiction, and not disbarred or suspended . . . may provide
legal services in this jurisdiction that (1) . . . are not services for which the forum requires pro hac vice admission; or (2) are services that the lawyer is authorized to provide by federal law or other law of this jurisdiction.”); id. R. 6.4
(“A lawyer may serve as a director, officer, or member of an organization involved in reform of the law or its administration . . . .”); id. R. 7.2(a) (“Subject
to the requirements of Rules 7.1 and 7.3, a lawyer may advertise . . . .”); id.
R. 7.3(d) (“Notwithstanding the prohibitions [from contacting prospective clients for pecuniary gain] in paragraph (a), a lawyer may participate with a
prepaid or group lawyer service plan . . . .”); id. R. 7.4(a) (“A lawyer may communicate the fact that a lawyer does or does not practice in particular fields of
law.”); id. R. 7.4(b) (“A lawyer admitted to engage in patent practice . . . may
use the designation ‘Patent Attorney’. . . .”); id. R. 7.4(c) (“A lawyer engaged in
Admiralty practice may use the designation ‘Admiralty’ . . . .”); id. R. 7.5(b) (“A
law firm with offices in more than one jurisdiction may use the same name
. . . .”); id. R. 7.5(d) (“Lawyers may state or imply that they practice in a partnership or other organization only when that is the fact.”).
23. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Release No. 33-8150, 67 Fed. Reg. 71,670, 71,673 (Dec. 2,
2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205) (“Under certain circumstances, these
[proposed] provisions permit or require attorneys to effect a so-called ‘noisy
withdrawal’ and to notify the Commission that they have done so and permit
attorneys to report evidence of material violations to the Commission.”); see
also Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Release No. 33-8156, 68 Fed. Reg. 6324, 6324–25 (Feb. 6, 2003) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 205, 240, 290).
For discussions of the SEC regulations governing securities lawyers, and
particularly the SEC’s consideration of a mandatory reporting rule, see Rutherford B. Campbell, Jr. & Eugene R. Gaetke, The Ethical Obligation of Transactional Lawyers to Act as Gatekeepers, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 9, 25–26 (2003);
Stephen Fraidin & Laura B. Mutterperl, Advice for Lawyers: Navigating the
New Realm of Federal Regulation of Legal Ethics, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 609, 647–
54 (2003); Thomas D. Morgan, Sarbanes-Oxley: A Complication, Not a Contribution, in the Effort to Improve Corporate Lawyers’ Professional Conduct, 17
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SEC proposal would have required lawyers to alert the SEC to
public corporations’ wrongdoing through a “noisy withdrawal.”24 The ABA’s response was that SEC regulation should
not preempt disciplinary rules that, in most states, give lawyers discretion to report client wrongdoing.25 The ABA argued
that a mandatory disclosure rule would “remov[e] the flexibility
that lawyers need in order to have time to counsel their corporate clients effectively” and would be “undesirable, costly and
unnecessary.”26 Consistent with this approach, the ABA
amended its model confidentiality rule to expand lawyers’ discretion to report client misconduct, but pointedly rejected a
mandatory disclosure obligation in the vein of the SEC’s proposal.27
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 5–6 (2003); Samantha Ahuja, Note, What Do I Do
Now? A Lawyer’s Duty Post-Sarbanes-Oxley, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 1263, 1317–30
(2004).
24. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed. Reg. at 71,674 (proposing that a lawyer who does not receive an
appropriate response from a corporate client regarding an internal report of a
securities violation be required to stop representing the company, notify the
SEC of his withdrawal, and “disaffirm” any securities filings that are
“tainted”); Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Attorney Conduct
Rules Under Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Jan. 23, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/news/
press/2003-13.htm (noting deferral of the proposal); see also Roger C. Cramton
et al., Legal and Ethical Duties of Lawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 VILL. L.
REV. 725, 809–16 (2004) (discussing the proposal).
25. See Letter from Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., President, Am. Bar Ass’n, to the
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Dec. 18, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/
proposed/s74502/apcarlton1.htm [hereinafter Letter from ABA to SEC]. At the
time of its response to the SEC’s request for comments, the ABA itself had recently rejected proposed confidentiality exceptions that would give lawyers
discretion in limited circumstances to report clients’ financial wrongdoing, but
the proposed exceptions were reconsidered and adopted soon after. See MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2)–(3) (2006); Am. Bar Ass’n Task Force
on Corporate Responsibility, Preliminary Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, 58 BUS. LAW. 189, 205–07 (2002).
26. Letter from ABA to SEC, supra note 25; see also E. Norman Veasey,
The Ethical and Professional Responsibilities of the Lawyer for the Corporation
in Responding to Fraudulent Conduct by Corporate Officers or Agents, 70
TENN. L. REV. 1, 21 (2002) (“To the extent that the lawyer’s leverage to remonstrate effectively with the client to prevent or rectify fraud is an important
goal—and I think it is—that goal is clearly better achieved if the lawyer has
discretion to disclose or not to disclose, depending on the circumstances.”). See
generally Christin M. Stephens, Comment, Sarbanes-Oxley and Regulation of
Lawyers’ Conduct: Pushing the Boundaries of the Duty of Confidentiality, 24
ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 271, 281–86 (2005) (discussing the SEC proposal
and the ABA response).
27. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2)–(3) (2006) (allowing lawyers to disclose information to prevent clients from committing crimes
or frauds in furtherance of which the lawyers’ services have been used, or to
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In general, when the bar asks lawmakers to defer to permissive rules (such as the attorney-client confidentiality exceptions), the bar’s argument is that the rules reflect a considered
judgment that it is important to allow lawyers to decide for
themselves how to act, rather than mandating lawyers’ conduct—either through ethics codes or other law.28 That judgment may rest on a variety of rationales, including the premise
that lawyers making individualized decisions are in the best
position to judge how to proceed, the notion that lawyers’
autonomy is worthy of respect, or the argument that there simply is no best choice among the alternative courses of conduct.
The code drafters’ judgment in favor of discretion arguably deserves respect because the drafters have special expertise in
understanding the true work of, and competing pulls upon,
lawyers.29 Insofar as a state’s highest court has adopted the
ABA model as part of the local professional rules, so that a
permissive rule might be said to reflect a considered decision
by the bench as well as the bar, the argument that external
lawmakers should defer and respect lawyers’ discretion has
greater force.30
The validity of this kind of argument depends upon
whether it is accurate to characterize a particular permissive
provision as embodying a normative judgment favoring discretion not only for purposes of professional discipline but also for
purposes of regulation more generally. Each permissive rule
implicitly raises two questions. First, does a rule telling lawmitigate injuries resulting from such crimes or frauds); id. R. 1.13(c) (allowing
lawyers to reveal information under limited circumstances when necessary to
prevent injury to an organizational client).
28. As discussed in Parts IV.A–C, however, the permissive nature of a
rule does not always signal an intent of the drafters to defer entirely to lawyer
discretion. Nor does the fact that the codes believe a rule granting discretion is
appropriate necessarily mean that other law-making institutions (e.g., courts)
will agree or that the code drafters expect them to agree.
29. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 9 (2006) (noting the
“conflicting responsibilities” that lawyers encounter); Richard E. Flamm, Looking Ahead to Ethics 2015: Or Why I Still Do Not Get the ABA Model Conflict of
Interest Rules, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 273, 274 (1999) (“No one can honestly
quarrel, furthermore, with either the Commission Members’ credentials, or
the diligence with which they have tackled their duties . . . .”).
30. Cf. Green, supra note 3, at 387 (“Where professional norms are clear,
they are presumptively worthy of respect. . . . If one accepts that the professional norms, particularly as embodied in the lawyer codes, are a reasonable
articulation of the elements of effective legal assistance, then criminal prosecutions that are in tension with professional norms should be a cause for concern.”).
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yers they “may” do something really mean it? In other words, is
lawyer discretion meant to be as broad as it appears on the face
of the rule? Second, did the ABA (or state) code drafters in fact
make a normative judgment about what lawyers may or may
not do, to which they intended other lawmakers, in other contexts, to defer? Permissive rules conceivably reflect various
purposes and understandings, so the answers to these two
questions may differ from provision to provision.
The questions concerning the interpretation of the codes’
permissive rules have broad implications for lawyer regulation.
State31 and federal statutes,32 civil procedure rules,33 and administrative regulations34 all restrict lawyers from engaging in
aspects of conduct that permissive ethics rules appear to authorize—for example, restricting lawyers’ discretion regarding
whether to disclose or maintain confidences,35 to accept a
31. For example, some state child abuse reporting statutes require lawyers to report threatened harm, when confidentiality rules typically leave the
reporting decision to the lawyers’ discretion. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-353
(Supp. 2006) (“Any attorney . . . having reasonable cause to suspect that a
child is . . . an abused child, shall cause an oral report to be made immediately . . . .”); OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.005 (2003) (including “attorney” as a
“[p]ublic or private official” who has a duty to report child abuse under section
419B.010).
32. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 327(a) (2000) (stating that a lawyer who “hold[s]
or represent[s] an interest adverse to the estate” should not represent the estate), with MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(4) (2006) (allowing a
client to waive his lawyer’s conflict of interest).
33. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g) (requiring a lawyer serving as class
counsel to “adequately represent the interests of the class”), with MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (2006) (providing opportunities to waive
conflicts of interest).
34. For example, the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) brought charges
against the law firm of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler for allegedly
assisting its clients in submitting misleading information in violation of 12
C.F.R. § 563.180(b)(1) (1989) (current version at 12 C.F.R. § 563.180(b)(1)
(2006)). See Dennis E. Curtis, Old Knights and New Champions: Kaye,
Scholer, the Office of Thrift Supervision, and the Pursuit of the Dollar, 66 S.
CAL. L. REV. 985, 988–91 (1993). The agency interpreted its regulations to forbid financial institutions’ lawyers from submitting information that they believed, but did not know, to be false. See id. at 991. Such conduct would ordinarily be permissible under the Model Rules, at least in the context of
advocacy. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3), 3.9 (2006). See
generally Zacharias, Understanding Recent Trends, supra note 8, at 16–18
(discussing administrative regulations imposed by other federal agencies that
followed the OTS model).
35. See SEC Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing
and Practicing Before the Commission in the Representation of the Issuer, 17
C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1)–(3) (2006) (requiring a lawyer to report fraud to the chief
legal officer and the chief executive officer, or to the board of directors if the

GREEN_ZACHARIAS_5FMT

2006]

PERMISSIVE ETHICS RULES

12/22/2006 10:56:08 AM

275

waiver of a conflict,36 or to charge a contingent fee.37 Lawyers
also are potentially subject to civil liability under common law
standards for acting within the range of discretion afforded by
a permissive rule.38 Whether legislatures, administrative agencies, and courts should give weight—perhaps even preemptive
weight—to an ethics rule that authorizes lawyers to exercise
discretion depends, at least initially, on the meaning of the rule
and what it is intended to accomplish.
To date, little attention has been paid to the nature of
permissive ethics rules.39 This Article examines some of the existing examples of permissive rules and identifies the range of
premises that appear to underlie them. It demonstrates that
the extent of discretion accorded by the codes, even for disciplinary purposes, is narrower and less certain than initially appears. Moreover, the Article suggests that, given the current
state of professional regulation, one can rarely argue defini-

officers do not respond in a reasonable time); Patent and Trademark Office
Code of Professional Responsibility, 37 C.F.R. § 10.85(b)(1) (2006) (“A practitioner who receives information clearly establishing that . . . [a] client has, in
the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal
shall promptly call upon the client to rectify the same, and if the client refuses
or is unable to do so the practitioner shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal.”).
36. See 11 U.S.C. § 327(a).
37. See Board of Veterans’ Appeals: Rules of Practice, 38 C.F.R.
§ 20.609(d)(2)(i) (2006) (prohibiting a lawyer to charge a contingent fee when a
“disinterested third party” is funding the litigation on the claimant’s or appellant’s behalf ); see also Assistance Program Under the 9/11 Heroes Stamp Act
of 2001, 70 Fed. Reg. 43,214, 43,215 (July 26, 2005) (to be codified at 44 C.F.R.
pt. 153) (“[A]ny fee arrangement (including contingency, hourly, etc.) exceeding 5% of an eligible claimant’s payment from the Heroes Stamp Act fund
would not be in the best interest of the eligible claimant.”); Lester Brickman,
The Market for Contingent Fee-Financed Tort Litigation: Is It Price Competitive?, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 65, 92 n.105 (2003) (listing statutes and court rules
that limit the amount of contingent fees).
38. See, e.g., Lawrence J. Fox, It Takes More Than Cheek to Lose Our Way,
77 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 277, 284 (2003) (noting that when the ABA amended
Rule 1.6, it increased lawyers’ risk of civil liability for failing to report client
misconduct because they “no longer have the shield of 1.6’s prohibition on disclosure of confidential information”).
39. But see Samuel J. Levine, Taking Ethical Discretion Seriously: Ethical
Deliberation as Ethical Obligation, 37 IND. L. REV. 21, 46 (2003); Fred C.
Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Reconceptualizing Advocacy Ethics, 74 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1, 52 (2005) (arguing that permissive rules are not necessarily
meant to give lawyers unbridled discretion, but may “presuppose that lawyers
will exercise professional conscience in deciding how to act in individual cases
within the category identified by the rule”); George W. Overton, Permissive
Duties, CBA REC., June–July 1997, at 46, 50.
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tively that a permissive rule reflects a normative judgment
that is meant to be respected by other lawmakers. This conclusion has importance not only for how lawmakers should view
permissive professional rules, but also for how rule drafters
should develop such rules in the future.40
Part I of this Article identifies three different ways of characterizing permissive rules, each of which has significance for
determining the extent of lawyers’ discretion under the rules.
Part II describes potential limits on lawyers’ discretion, some
arising from the professional codes themselves and some imposed by outside regulation. Part III discusses the possible justifications for permissive rules, each of which seems to underlie
at least some of the codes’ permissive provisions. Finally, Part
IV analyzes the significance of the existence of these multiple
characterizations and justifications for institutions writing, implementing, and enforcing the rules.
I. THE NATURE OF DISCRETION IN PERMISSIVE
ETHICS RULES
Permissive ethics rules take various forms. Some give lawyers two alternatives, or a range of alternatives, without even
implicitly suggesting grounds for choosing between or among
them. For example, in most jurisdictions, a lawyer who reasonably believes (but does not know) that a client in a civil case
will testify falsely “may” refuse to offer the testimony.41 In rendering legal advice to clients, a lawyer “may refer not only to
law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social
and political factors, that may be relevant to the client’s situation.”42 “[A] lawyer representing an indigent client may pay
court costs and expenses of litigation on behalf of the client.”43
And a lawyer may “contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case.”44 On their face, rules such as these
have no limiting principles.

40. Part IV of this Article notes some implications of our analysis of permissive rules for courts and other lawmakers. However, this Article focuses
primarily on identifying the nature of permissive rules—an important endeavor that the previous literature has omitted. This Article leaves the normative issues of precisely how other lawmakers should respond to permissive
rules to another day.
41. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) (2006).
42. Id. R. 2.1.
43. Id. R. 1.8(e)(2).
44. Id. R. 1.8(i)(2).
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Other permissive rules cabin lawyers’ discretion. For example, lawyers may disclose client confidences in order to prevent certain harms45 or defend themselves against accusations
of wrongdoing,46 but only to the extent they “reasonably believe[] necessary” to accomplish the authorized end.47 A lawyer
may accept a client’s informed waiver of concurrent conflicts of
interests, but only under specified circumstances48 and when
“the lawyer reasonably believes that [he or she] will be able to
provide competent and diligent representation.”49 A lawyer
“may limit the scope of the representation” with client consent,50 but some codes circumscribe that authority to apply only
in situations in which its exercise is “reasonable under the circumstances.”51 Lawyers “may withdraw from representing a
client” in a series of prescribed instances,52 but must seek permission of a tribunal to do so in litigation53 and take steps to
protect the client’s interests.54 Although provisions such as
these limit when and, in some cases, how the lawyer may exercise discretion, a lawyer acting within the limitations nevertheless is given a range of choice.55
45. See id. R. 1.6(b)(2).
46. See id. R. 1.6(b)(5).
47. Id. R. 1.6(b); see McClure v. Thompson, 323 F.3d 1233, 1242–43 (9th
Cir. 2003) (concluding that the future crime exception to attorney-client confidentiality includes a requirement that the disclosing attorney’s belief be reasonable).
48. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (2006).
49. Id. R. 1.7(b)(1).
50. Id. R. 1.2(c).
51. Id. cmt. 7.
52. Id. R. 1.16(b).
53. See id. R. 1.6(c).
54. See id. R. 1.6(d).
55. A third set of discretionary rules seems to grant discretion implicitly,
by allocating authority to lawyers to make a category of decisions without
specifying the limits on that authority. For example, although the codes typically require lawyers to abide by client decisions concerning the “objectives of
representation,” they also imply that lawyers have discretion to determine the
means to implement the client’s objectives. See id. R. 1.2(a) & cmts. 1–2. The
pre-2002 version of the Model Rules seems to grant lawyers full authority to
make strategic decisions in pursuing clients’ objectives, but the current version is more ambiguous. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2
cmt. 1 (2001) (assigning “responsibility for legal and tactical issues” to the lawyer), with MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 2 (2006) (noting that
clients “normally defer” to lawyers regarding tactical decisions, but concluding
that “[b]ecause of the varied nature of the matters about which a lawyer and
client might disagree and because the actions in question may implicate the
interests of a tribunal or other persons, this Rule does not prescribe how such
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In either case, a key threshold question is how, as a general matter, permissive rules should be viewed. There are three
basic possibilities. A rule stating that a lawyer may, but implicitly need not, act in a particular way can be seen as equivalent
to not regulating at all. It may be seen as affirmatively authorizing a lawyer to make any decision within the range of choice
defined by the rule. Finally, it may be seen as authorizing a
lawyer to make choices, but only on terms, or based on considerations, implied by the rule. The resolution of this threshold
question should inf luence whether and how other lawmakers
take account of a permissive rule.
A. PERMISSIVE RULES AS NONREGULATION
Consider the first possibility. It is not self-evident that
permissive rules reflect anything other than a drafting alternative to nonregulation. Arguably, permissive rules simply indicate where mandatory rules end and the absence of regulation
begins. They describe an area of conduct where the professional
rules are silent.
For example, the rule on attorneys’ fees states that a lawyer “may” share fees with another lawyer if certain conditions
are fulfilled.56 Is this different from a mandatory rule stating
that a lawyer “may not” share fees unless the same conditions
are fulfilled? With respect to the latter rule, it would be an exaggeration to conclude that the drafters affirmatively left fee
sharing to lawyers’ “discretion” in all cases in which the conditions are satisfied. The more logical interpretation is that the
drafters took no position on (or did not regulate) fee sharing
that occurs when the preconditions are satisfied.57 At least
disagreements are to be resolved”). This Article will not address this category
of discretionary rules as there is some dispute about whether these rules are,
in fact, permissive; arguably, the rules are better viewed as nonregulation
rather than permissive regulation.
56. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(e) (2006).
57. The difference between not regulating and authorizing a choice of conduct is highlighted by the rule requiring a lawyer to expedite litigation provided that doing so is “consistent with the interests of the client.” Id. R. 3.2.
This rule does not appear to regulate what lawyers must or may do when expediting litigation is not consistent with the client’s interests. See id. Even so,
it would be surprising to find courts or ethics committees interpreting the rule
as if it affirmatively accords lawyers discretion to delay whenever delay, in
and of itself, benefits the client. Indeed, the comments to Model Rule 3.2 suggest that a lawyer must consider more than the client’s desires. See id. cmt. 1
(stating that a lawyer who fails to expedite must have “some substantial purpose other than delay”).
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some of the other permissive rules, when read in context, have
similar effects—suggesting nothing more than an exception to a
mandatory standard and leaving the excepted area unregulated.58 The term “may” simply is used to set boundaries establishing when the rule’s mandate or prohibition applies.59
On the surface, the argument in favor of viewing permissive rules as nonregulation is belied by the fact that the drafters had a drafting choice. That the drafters opted for a permissive formulation (“may . . . if”) rather than a mandatory
formulation (“may not . . . unless”) suggests that they intended
to do more than simply create an exception, an unregulated
field. However, at least where the permissive rule serves as an
exception to multiple mandates, the permissive approach may
be the only drafting option available to accomplish nonregulation.
Assume, for instance, that trial lawyers generally “may
not” offer evidence they know to be false,60 but otherwise generally “must” offer any other relevant evidence that will help
the client’s cause61 or that the client insists on presenting.62 If
58. For example, Model Rule 3.1 includes two sentences, the first stating
that a lawyer “shall not” make frivolous assertions, and the second stating
that a lawyer in a criminal case “may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as
to require that every element of the case be established.” Id. R. 3.1. The obvious reading is that the second sentence is meant simply to make clear that the
rule against asserting frivolous defenses does not preclude a criminal defense
lawyer from ensuring that the prosecution meets its burden of proof. Nothing
suggests that the rule is meant to give the criminal defense lawyer discretion
to require the prosecution to prove its case. Almost certainly, that choice—
ethically and constitutionally—belongs to the client.
59. See, e.g., id. R. 1.8(i) (“A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation . . . except that the
lawyer may: (1) acquire a lien . . . to secure the lawyer’s fees or expenses; and
(2) contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case.”).
Another interesting example of this phenomenon is Model Rule 1.6, which
provides that a lawyer “may” reveal otherwise confidential information when
necessary “to comply with other law or a court order.” Id. R. 1.6(b)(6). Because
the exception does not require a lawyer to comply with other law, it suggests
that the drafters envision instances in which disobedience may be appropriate—perhaps in situations in which a lawyer seeks to challenge the “other
law.” However, the permissive language certainly is not meant to imply that
compliance with the law is purely discretionary; it simply articulates the
boundaries of the otherwise mandatory confidentiality rules while requiring
the lawyer (and other lawmaker) to decide whether confidentiality or other
law should take precedence, based on considerations not apparent in the professional rules.
60. See id. R. 3.3(a)(3).
61. This arguably is required as a matter of competence under Model Rule
1.1. See id. R. 1.1 & cmt. 2. The Model Code made this obligation more explicit
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the drafters want to exclude from these opposing mandates
evidence which a lawyer “reasonably believes” to be false, the
obvious way to do so is by saying that the lawyer “may” (but
need not) offer such evidence. One cannot necessarily assume
that employing permissive language has a broader purpose
than identifying the limits of the mandatory rules. If identifying those limits is indeed the objective, then even though the
rule says “may,” it probably does not reflect a judgment that
other lawmakers should respect the “autonomy” recognized by
the rule, on one hand, or that lawyers should regularly exercise
the “discretion” accorded by the rule, on the other.
B. PERMISSIVE RULES AS DEFERRING TO LAWYER CHOICE
The argument that permissive rules are equivalent to nonregulation depends on one’s attitude toward the rules. Not surprisingly, given lawyers’ self-interest and the structure of some
of the rules, many practicing lawyers take an extremely lawyer-protective view of permissive rules. They assume that
whenever ethics provisions permit lawyers to act in a certain
way, the provisions are defining an area in which lawyer conduct is meant to be unconstrained.63 On this understanding,
the choice of conduct belongs entirely to individual lawyers.64 A
lawyer’s decision within the area covered by a permissive rule
is both unregulated by the disciplinary process and intended to
be free from other regulatory oversight.

by providing that a lawyer “shall not . . . [f ]ail to seek the lawful objectives of
his client through reasonably available means.” See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L
RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101(A)(1) (1980).
62. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7 (1980) (requiring
lawyers to follow their clients’ directions except as to matters “not affecting
the merits of the cause or substantially prejudicing the rights of the client”);
cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 1 (2006) (offering suggestions but not definitively prescribing how to resolve tactical disagreements between a lawyer and client when discussion between them fails to yield a resolution).
63. See, e.g., Zacharias & Green, supra note 39, at 46–47 (discussing the
gloss modern practitioners place on the codes).
64. See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR. & RICHARD W. PAINTER, PROFESSIONAL AND
PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE LAWYER 107 (2d ed. 2001) (“The Code
also, like the Model Rules, is permissive; in no circumstances is a lawyer required to disclose . . . .”); David McGowan, Why Not Try the Carrot? A Modest
Proposal to Grant Immunity to Lawyers Who Disclose Client Financial Misconduct, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1825, 1825 n.1 (2004) (assuming that discretionary
exceptions to confidentiality do not anticipate any limits on lawyers’ exercise
of discretion).
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If one interprets the permissive rules, or particular permissive rules, as endorsing professional self-restraint as the
preferred disciplinary approach, a key question is what external lawmakers should make of that signal. The ABA drafters
have claimed not to work with an eye toward how other regulators will use or enforce the codes.65 That does not mean, however, that the drafters are indifferent regarding the issue of
whether other lawmakers will respect their regulatory preferences; presumably, the drafters at least hope that other regulators will give some weight to the considered judgments underlying the rules.66 How far this expectation extends, however, will
not be clear from the terms of the rules.
C. PERMISSIVE RULES AS REGULATED DISCRETION
The ABA drafters’ explanation that “may” signifies something more than silence suggests a third, narrower understanding of the permissive rules; namely, that permissive rules give
lawyers “discretion,” but only “discretion to exercise professional judgment.”67 This approach is consistent with standards
governing other legal actors who are expected to make discretionary decisions based on particular principles and are taken
to task for abusing their discretion.68 The explanation of “may”
65. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 11 (2006) (“To the extent that lawyers meet the obligations of their profession, the occasion for government regulation is obviated. Self-regulation also helps maintain the legal
profession’s independence from government domination.”).
66. See, e.g., id. ¶ 14 (“Violation of a Rule should not itself give rise to a
cause of action against a lawyer. . . . The Rules are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are not designed to be a basis for civil liability.”).
67. Id.
68. For example, judges’ discretionary decisions typically must be principled and may be reviewable for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 304 (2000) (noting that “the District Court’s [decision] was an abuse of discretion” in “violation of . . . due process”); Maureen
Armour, Rethinking Judicial Discretion: Sanctions and the Conundrum of the
Close Case, 50 SMU L. REV. 493, 518–22 (1997) (discussing the difficulty in
relying on judicial discretion to issue sanctions under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure Rule 11 because of the ambiguity and lack of consistent meaning of
the word “discretion”); George C. Christie, An Essay on Discretion, 1986 DUKE
L.J. 747, 764–72 (1986) (discussing how constitutional adjudication and the
use of legal tests involving multiple factors have increased discretion in the
judicial decision-making process). The meaning of “discretion,” however, often
varies depending upon the context and the actor to which it applies. See
RONALD M. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 131–39 (1977) (discussing
the various meanings of the word “discretion” and its influence on judges’ decisions); George P. Fletcher, Some Unwise Reflections About Discretion, 47 LAW
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in the introduction to the Model Rules suggests that one should
interpret the permissive provisions with a view to their implicit
limitations.69 Although the rules give lawyers choices, lawyers
are required to exercise “professional judgment” in selecting
among those choices.70 That is, lawyers remain subject to regulatory oversight, but the standard by which lawyers’ conduct is
judged is more deferential than in other areas of conduct governed by the ethics rules.
Under this view of permissive rules, the codes’ allocation of
discretion often comes with an implicit mandate. Lawyers’
choice of conduct is not unfettered, as it might be were the
rules simply silent regarding the type of conduct in question.
Rather, lawyers have “discretion” akin to that of a judge or administrative agency that is accorded broad leeway. Like these
other decision-makers, lawyers may be criticized for abusing
their discretion.71 Perhaps lawyers may be disciplined for failing to “exercise professional judgment” implicitly contemplated
by particular permissive rules. Maybe lawyers merely will suffer professional opprobrium for exercising discretion inadequately.72 But in either case, the permission to choose among
the options comes with expectations. It is subject to regulation.73
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 269, 271–85 (1984) (reviewing various groups’ perception
of the meaning of “discretion” and analyzing the degree to which discretion is
accepted as a justification for a decision). Scholars have noted that prosecutors’ discretion, though broad, is expected to be exercised with a view to “serving justice” and maintaining prosecutorial neutrality. See generally Bruce A.
Green & Fred Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 837, 840–
52 (2004) (discussing prosecutorial discretion and neutrality); Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do
Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 53–56 (1991) (discussing prosecutors’ obligation
to serve justice).
69. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 14 (2006).
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., id. ¶ 15 (“Compliance with the rules . . . depends primarily
upon understanding and voluntary compliance, secondarily upon reinforcement by peer and public opinion, and finally, when necessary, upon enforcement through disciplinary proceedings.”).
72. See, e.g., id. ¶ 7 (“Many of a lawyer’s responsibilities are prescribed in
the Rules of Professional Conduct . . . . However, a lawyer is also guided by . . .
the approbation of professional peers.”).
73. Of course, the failure to articulate grounds for the exercise of discretion under the permissive rules undermines their force. See William H. Simon,
Wrongs of Ignorance and Ambiguity: Lawyer Responsibility for Collective Misconduct, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 20 (2005) (noting ABA drafters’ persistent failure to indicate how lawyers should exercise their discretion to disclose corporate clients’ confidences to avoid future harm).
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This interpretation makes considerable sense when one
compares permissive ethics provisions to vague or opentextured rules that also envision variations in how different
lawyers will act. Both open-textured provisions (such as requirements of “reasonable diligence”74 and reasonable communications with the client75 and prohibitions against “unreasonable fee[s]”76) and permissive provisions incorporate
“standards” rather than bright-line “rules.”77 Like permissive
provisions, open-textured provisions accord lawyers a degree of
discretion. But the open-textured provisions envision the exercise of discretion only within the narrow boundaries of otherwise acceptable behavior. Implicitly, they signal enforcement
authorities to refrain from proceeding against lawyers who
make good-faith and plausible but, in hindsight, erroneous
judgments in areas of uncertainty. In contrast, permissive provisions imply a broader degree of discretion. They anticipate
that lawyers will exercise professional judgment in the whole
range of cases, not just close cases, and that lawyers will not be
sanctioned for making wrong choices except perhaps in extreme
situations in which they have failed to exercise judgment at all.
Understood in this way, permissive ethics rules clearly differ from nonregulation (i.e., silence). They, in fact, are a form of
regulation that has traditional roots. Until the mid-twentieth
century, the professional codes relied less on codified rules than
on the expectation of individual lawyers’ self-restraint, guided
by professional norms.78 The contemporary codes for the most
74.
75.
76.
77.

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2006).
See id. R. 1.4.
Id. R. 1.5.
Cf. LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES: MORALITY, RULES, AND THE DILEMMAS OF LAW 30 (2001) (“The quality that identifies a rule and distinguishes it from a standard is the quality of determinateness.”); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 26–41, 120–32 (1961)
(distinguishing rules and standards); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE
RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN
LAW AND IN LIFE 1–16 (1991) (providing examples and explanations of various
types of rules); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis,
42 DUKE L.J. 557, 559 (1992) (offering “an economic analysis of the extent to
which legal commands should be promulgated as rules or standards”).
78. See Fred C. Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalism and Client Interests, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1303, 1314–16 (1995). Some modern commentators have argued that lawyer regulation has become overly legalistic and
should rely more heavily on lawyers’ exercise of professional judgment. See,
e.g., WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE 15 (1998) (contrasting a
“rule-focused approach” with a more contextual approach allowing the exercise
of professional judgment).
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part have rejected the regime of self-regulation, but one can
view the remaining permissive rules as endorsing informed
self-regulation with respect to limited areas of conduct. This
understanding of the permissive rules raises obvious interpretive difficulties, because the codes do not make explicit the criteria on which professional judgment is to be exercised. Yet the
emphasis on self-restraint is theoretically defensible as a mode
of professional regulation.
Many commentators accept the position that at least some
permissive rules are regulatory in nature—that they require
lawyers to make an informed choice in individual cases about
the conduct that they are to take.79 In their view, for example,
lawyers deciding whether to disclose client wrongdoing as permitted under a “future harm” exception to the confidentiality
rule80 must take into account both clients’ interests in confiden79. See Levine, supra note 39, at 46 (arguing that lawyers must at least
exercise their discretion); Zacharias & Green, supra note 39, at 53–55 (same).
This strain of reasoning is evident in the cases that evaluate whether criminal
defense lawyers have performed so ineffectively as to violate the constitutional
standards set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 669–700 (1984).
For example, in Rompilla v. Beard, the U.S. Supreme Court considered a lawyer’s failure to investigate. See 125 S. Ct. 2456, 2462–63 (2005). The Court
hinted that such a failure, by itself, might not have constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. See id. at 2463 (noting that there was “room for debate” on
the issue). The Court, however, held that the lawyer’s failure to examine a file
from a previous conviction that the prosecution had turned over and on which
counsel had notice the prosecution intended to rely was unreasonable. See id.
at 2467. Justice O’Connor’s concurrence noted that the lawyer’s failure to
make a choice rendered the behavior improper because it constituted “‘inattention, not reasoned strategic judgment.’” Id. at 2471 (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003)).
80. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2006). There is a
wide variation among jurisdictions’ rules authorizing lawyers to disclose client
confidences to prevent harm to third parties. States such as New York have
provisions based on the ABA Model Code providing that, despite the general
obligation to preserve client confidences, a lawyer “may reveal . . . [t]he intention of a client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the
crime.” N.Y. CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C) (2003) (emphasis
added). Others emulate the pre-2002 version of the Model Rules, allowing disclosures only to prevent criminal acts a lawyer believes are “likely to result in
death . . . or substantial bodily harm.” CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3100(B) (2004). Yet other states require disclosures to avert certain harms. See,
e.g., WIS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2006) (“A lawyer shall reveal
[client confidences] to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to
prevent the client from committing a criminal or fraudulent act that the lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm
or in substantial injury to the financial interest or property of another.”). Some
states authorize lawyers to disclose client confidences to prevent criminal
fraud that is likely to result in financial harm to another, regardless of
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tiality and third-party interests.81 At least in extreme cases, a
lawyer abuses his professional discretion when he makes a decision arbitrarily82 or based on irrelevant or impermissible considerations.83 It would thus be improper for a lawyer to treat
the future harm exception as a default rule and to bargain at
the outset of the representation never to reveal client wrongdoing, or to decide categorically never to disclose client wrongdoing as permitted by the rule, because doing so would derogate
third-party interests that the rule protects.84
However, even accepting the baseline assumption that
some permissive rules contain limits on the exercise of discretion, the extent of those limits typically is unclear. For examwhether the lawyer’s services were used in the fraud. See, e.g., N.J. RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2006) (“A lawyer shall reveal” client confidences
to prevent the client or another “from committing a criminal, illegal or fraudulent act that the lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in . . . substantial injury to the financial interest or property of another.”).
81. See Levine, supra note 39, at 47–52 (describing a deliberative model of
exercising discretion); Zacharias & Green, supra note 39, at 53–54 (discussing
potentially mandatory aspects of exercising discretion under the permissive
exceptions to confidentiality); Limor Zer-Gutman, Revising the Ethical Rules
of Attorney Client Confidentiality: Towards a New Discretionary Rule, 45 LOY.
L. REV. 669, 705–06 (1999) (suggesting that a discretionary rule is not a voluntary rule, but a “compulsory and sanctionary rule” that is violated when the
lawyer does not apply the rule in good faith or with minimal competence); cf.
Mario J. Madden, The Indiscreet Role of Lawyer Discretion in Confidentiality
Rules, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 603, 604–05 (2001) (criticizing the amount of
discretion a lawyer is afforded under confidentiality exceptions, partly because
moral judgments made under the exceptions are not “systematically legitimate”).
82. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, The Role of Personal Values in Professional
Decisionmaking, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 19, 51–52 (1997) (“While a lawyer
could decide whether or not to represent a particular client by flipping a coin,
it would be improper for [a lawyer] to decide in an equally arbitrary manner
whether to betray [a child client’s] confidences” to protect the child from lifethreatening harm.).
83. See, e.g., id. at 52, 54 (arguing that it would be impermissible to decide
whether to disclose a child client’s confidences to protect the child from harm
“on the basis of the lawyer’s self-interest, for example, in order to avoid the
public criticism that might attend one decision or the other if the facts became
known,” but that it would be permissible for a lawyer to act in her self-interest
in deciding whether to reveal client confidences in the lawyer’s self-defense
under current Model Rule 1.6(b)(5), because discretion is afforded for the lawyer’s benefit).
84. The California Rules of Professional Conduct seem to take the opposite position: under the strict language of the new California confidentiality
provision and its comments, neither disclosure nor non-disclosure under the
future crime exception should ever subject a lawyer to discipline. See CAL.
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3-100 & cmts. 4–5, 9 (2004). The terms of the
rule thus suggest to lawyers that they may bargain away their options.
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ple, whether it would be wrong for a lawyer to establish a flat
policy that he will always disclose client wrongdoing when the
rule affords discretion to do so is a harder question than
whether he may always refuse to disclose.85 Announcing a practice of reporting misconduct at the outset of representation
educates the client. If it is exclusively the client’s interest that
will be impaired by the revelation of confidences, the lawyer
arguably should inform the client ex ante of the circumstances
under which the lawyer will disclose. On the other hand, if a
permissive disclosure exception is intended to further the public interest in law compliance by allowing lawyers to learn of
and then discourage proposed wrongdoing by clients, it is less
clear that a lawyer should be allowed to adopt an across-theboard position foreclosing the exercise of discretion in either direction.
Consider another example that highlights the difficulty of
identifying when limits on discretion apply. Most states have
permissive conflict-of-interest provisions which provide that a
lawyer may accept a waiver when certain conditions are satisfied. May a lawyer legitimately adopt an across-the-board practice of accepting all cases in which a client agrees to waive a
conflict? Arguably, a lawyer who might become a prospective
witness and can satisfy a lawyer-as-witness provision86 still has
an obligation to decline representation when the client can easily retain an equally good lawyer who will not be prone to a
disqualification motion. A lawyer confronted by an unsophisticated client who is willing to waive a significant conflict under
the governing conflict-of-interest rule87 simply to avoid having
to seek another lawyer might also, in some circumstances, need
to send the client elsewhere.88 Nevertheless, the contrary position is plausible—that the conflict rules, like rules governing
fees and initial retainer agreements, contemplate arms-length

85. For an argument supporting the latter position, see Richard W.
Painter, Rules Lawyers Play by, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 665, 666–67 (2001).
86. E.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.7 (2006) (prohibiting a
lawyer from acting as both advocate and witness in the same proceeding, subject to three exceptions).
87. E.g., id. R. 1.7.
88. See Fred C. Zacharias, Waiving Conflicts of Interest, 108 YALE L.J.
407, 433 (1998) (discussing lawyers’ obligations under the conflict-of-interest
rules).
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transactions between lawyers and clients and therefore allow
lawyers to exercise discretion entirely in their own interests.89
Withdrawal rules provide another example of the interpretive difficulties inherent in permissive ethics provisions. One
might argue that when the stated grounds for permissive withdrawal are satisfied, a lawyer may withdraw (subject to court
approval) for any reason at all.90 An alternative view, however,
is that a permissive withdrawal rule must be read in light of a
lawyer’s duty of loyalty to the client, so that withdrawal to
achieve certain ends is an abuse of the lawyer’s discretion to
withdraw.91 Cases holding that a lawyer may not drop a client
like a “hot potato” to accept another engagement, because doing
so is an act of disloyalty, illustrate this approach.92 In the end,
the extent of discretion accorded by each particular rule depends upon one’s interpretation of the rule’s purpose and effect.
D. IMPLICATIONS OF THE THREE CONCEPTIONS OF PERMISSIVE
RULES
The recognition that some permissive rules may be regulatory in nature—designed to identify areas in which lawyers’
choices must be the product of professional judgment, and not
be made arbitrarily—has significance for external regulation. It
means that even if judges and other lawmakers are naturally
inclined to defer to the code drafters’ normative judgments,
they should feel free to impose extra-code constraints when doing so would reinforce an obligation to exercise professional

89. The drafters of the Model Rules encourage this interpretation by noting, with respect to permissive rules, that “[n]o disciplinary action should be
taken when the lawyer chooses not to act or acts within the bounds of such
discretion.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 14 (2006). That statement is not definitive, however, because it does not define the “bounds of such
discretion.” See id.
90. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 550–51 & n.83
(1986) (arguing that where withdrawal will not harm the client, a lawyer may
withdraw under Model Rule 1.16(b) “for no reason or for a not very appealing
reason, such as to pursue recreational interests or . . . to make a higher fee doing extensive work for a new and wealthier client,” but also noting that contract law may provide a different answer).
91. See, e.g., Green, supra note 82, at 40–41 (arguing that it may be an
abuse of trust for a lawyer to withdraw based on undisclosed, highly particularized personal beliefs that could have been identified as potentially relevant
prior to accepting the representation).
92. E.g., Picker Int’l, Inc. v. Varian Assocs., 670 F. Supp. 1363, 1365 (N.D.
Ohio 1987) (“A firm may not drop a client like a hot potato, especially if it is in
order to keep happy a far more lucrative client.”).
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judgment that is implicitly contained in a professional rule. Doing so would merely complement the codes. It would provide
clearer guidance to lawyers than they receive from the permissive rules and would subject lawyers who abuse their discretion
to enforcement mechanisms that supplement, but are not inconsistent with, professional discipline. Thus, for example, a
decision by courts to impose civil liability for fraud when a lawyer’s failure to report client misconduct was, in hindsight, an
abuse of the discretion accorded by an ethics code’s confidentiality exception would arguably comport with the code drafters’
expectations.93
Similarly, to the extent that other permissive rules are
equivalent to nonregulation (i.e., they simply fail to take a position on a given type of conduct), those rules also should not constrain other lawmakers. The decision to leave conduct unregulated for disciplinary purposes is not evidence that the drafters
believe lawyers should never be regulated, nor does it necessarily reflect the drafters’ view of the alternative lawmakers’ relative competence to establish standards of behavior. The codes’
failure to regulate simply means that the drafters themselves
were unprepared, or could not agree, to dictate a single course
of conduct. This failure does not reveal their position on
whether other lawmakers should do so. The drafters may even
have affirmatively desired that other lawmakers set the standards and may have contemplated that any external legal
standards would be enforceable through professional discipline,
based on rules requiring lawyers to comply with other law. In
short, external regulators cannot fairly draw definitive conclusions from the code drafters’ failure to restrict particular conduct.
The situation is different, however, when a permissive rule
reflects an affirmative judgment by the drafters that the optimal way to regulate the particular conduct is self-regulation—
letting lawyers decide for themselves how to act, as a matter of
professional discretion. Such a rule can be interpreted in two
93. Indeed, the expectation that civil liability might be imposed in such
cases motivated opposition to some proposals for provisions that would permit
whistle-blowing by lawyers. See, e.g., Lawrence J. Fox, It’s All in the Atmosphere, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1447, 1448–50 (1994) (“If this rule were adopted as
an amendment to Model Rule 1.6, it would create significant liability exposure
for counsel. . . . [T]he fact that a lawyer had the discretion to disclose confidential information, and did not, will be no defense to the claim that if the lawyer
had disclosed confidential information some harm or other could have been
prevented.”).
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ways. The drafters may have preferred self-regulation for disciplinary purposes, but may have been indifferent on the question of whether other law should constrain lawyer discretion.
Alternatively, the drafters may have believed self-regulation to
be preferable for all purposes; in other words, that individual
lawyers not only are in a better position than the code drafters
to decide how to act in a particular case, but also are in a better
position to decide than lawmakers more generally. This is how
the ABA, in its submission to the SEC, chose to understand the
permissive provision on lawyers’ disclosure of client misconduct.94 Practicing lawyers likely take this view of most permissive provisions, contemplating that when they exercise discretion within the limits of the rules, they should be immune from
professional discipline, civil liability, and judicial oversight.
It is unclear whether code drafters generally share the expectation that lawmakers will treat the judgments in the codes’
permissive rules as preemptive. At least at first glance, this expectation seems presumptuous. Ethics rules are initially
drafted by bar associations, which have no law-making authority. The Model Rules explicitly deny any intent to substitute for
civil liability standards.95 In most jurisdictions, any legal force
the codes have derives from their adoption by the highest state
court.96 Thus, judgments made by the code drafters are subordinate to judgments of the courts. Moreover, insofar as judicial
rule-making authority is delegated by the legislature,97 even
judicially-adopted rules are subordinate to subsequent legislative judgments.
In some states, however, the authority underlying ethics
94. Letter from ABA to SEC, supra note 25 (“[M]andating withdrawal and
disaffirmance removes the flexibility that lawyers need in order to have time
to counsel their corporate clients effectively. In some instances, premature
withdrawal and disaffirmance of documents might seriously and unfairly
harm the issuer and its shareholders or create disruption in the market for
issuer’s securities, when more time spent with managers or expert advisers
might have avoided the need for the attorney to employ so extreme a measure.”).
95. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 20 (2006) (stating that
a violation of the Rules does not “give rise to a cause of action” or “create any
presumption . . . that a legal duty has been breached”).
96. See Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Federal Court Authority to
Regulate Lawyers: A Practice in Search of a Theory, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1303,
1308 nn.12–13 (2003) (observing that state judiciaries usually control state
regulation of lawyers).
97. See id. at 1308 n.13 (discussing the delegated authority of federal
courts).
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codes is different. Courts have primary responsibility for regulating the bar, and judicially-adopted professional rules therefore can preempt inconsistent state legislation.98 Indeed, cases
in some jurisdictions go so far as to hold that courts have negative inherent authority, meaning that state legislatures are
precluded from regulating the bar even interstitially.99 Hence,
judgments by code drafters that are approved by the courts
should, at least arguably, preempt inconsistent legislative
judgments.
The argument that permissive ethics codes create, or
should be deemed to create, an immunity from constraints under federal law is considerably weaker. The argument reduces
to a claim that the ethics codes represent the thrust of state
law, that the authority to regulate lawyers is reserved to the
states, and that federal law therefore cannot trump state rules
of lawyer conduct. The Washington State Bar Association recently made such an argument in response to the SarbanesOxley regulations, taking the position that its lawyers are forbidden from making disclosures that the SEC rules authorize
but that state confidentiality rules prohibit.100 One might simi98. See Charles W. Wolfram, Inherent Powers in the Crucible of Lawyer
Self-Protection: Reflections on the LLP Campaign, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 359, 362
(1998) [hereinafter Wolfram, Inherent Powers] (“Quite beyond that, most state
supreme courts also claim the exclusive power to regulate lawyers as the court
sees fit—even if the state’s legislature has enacted legislation that on its face
is applicable to lawyers.”); see also Charles W. Wolfram, Lawyer Turf and
Lawyer Regulation—The Role of the Inherent-Powers Doctrine, 12 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 1, 4–5 (1989) [hereinafter Wolfram, Lawyer Turf and Lawyer
Regulation] (discussing the alleged inherent power of courts to regulate lawyers).
99. See Thomas M. Alpert, The Inherent Power of the Courts to Regulate
the Practice of Law: An Historical Analysis, 32 BUFF. L. REV. 525, 543–55
(1983) (discussing the development of courts’ claims to the exclusive right to
regulate the bar and the more recent trend toward greater legislative control);
Amanda Irene Figgs, Shaulis v. Pennsylvania State Ethics Commission: The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Continues to Wield Its Exclusive Power to
Regulate the Manner in Which an Attorney Practices Law, 14 WIDENER L.J.
553, 553–54 (2005) (discussing a recent case in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected legislative controls on lawyer behavior); Wolfram, Inherent Powers, supra note 98, at 374 n.46 (citing “extravagant” applications of
negative inherent authority); Wolfram, Lawyer Turf and Lawyer Regulation,
supra note 98, at 7–12 (discussing cases applying “negative inherent authority”).
100. Wash. State Bar Ass’n, Interim Formal Op. (2003), available at http://
www.wsba.org/lawyers/groups/ethics2003/formalopinion.doc (“As a general
matter and with the current lack of case law on the pre-emption issue, a
Washington attorney cannot as a defense against a [Washington Rules of Professional Conduct] violation fairly claim to be complying in ‘good faith’ with
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larly argue that the SEC is forbidden to require lawyers to
make disclosures in circumstances in which such disclosures
are discretionary under a state confidentiality rule. Although
the state sovereignty argument is questionable as a constitutional matter,101 that is not to say that federal lawmakers
should, as a matter of policy, ignore state rules that reflect a
clear preference for individual self-regulation.
In the end, however, whether the drafters can reasonably
expect other lawmakers to defer to their judgment that lawyers
should be given discretion clearly depends upon the rationale
for each permissive rule. While the premise of one permissive
provision may be that self-regulation is preferable, and therefore that other lawmakers should follow suit, the premise of
others may be that self-regulation is limited or appropriate only
for disciplinary purposes. Parts II and III address these possibilities.
II. LIMITS ON LAWYER DISCRETION
The claim that other lawmakers should respect the discretion afforded by permissive ethics rules, and therefore that they
should refrain from making laws that encroach on lawyers’ discretion, is strongest when that discretion is unrestricted for
disciplinary purposes. If the code drafters themselves have imposed limits, it becomes harder to argue that other lawmakers
should accede to lawyer self-regulation. In at least some cases,
the drafters appear to have restricted discretion in ways not
necessarily evident from the face of the permissive rules. The
restrictions may derive either from a separate rule or from
other law or legal processes.

the SEC Regulations, as that term is used in Section 205.6(c) of the Regulations, if (s)he took an action that was contrary to this Formal Opinion.”); see
also Memorandum from the Sarbanes-Oxley Subcomm. of the Wash. State Bar
Ass’n Special Comm. for the Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct
to the President, President-elect, and Board of Governors, Wash. State Bar
Ass’n (July 2003), available at http://www.wsba.org/lawyers/groups/
ethics2003/sarbanesoxleymemotoboadofgovernors.doc (explaining the draft
Interim Formal Ethics Opinion).
101. See N.C. State Bar, Formal Op. 9 (2006) (holding that the SarbanesOxley requirements preempt North Carolina’s state confidentiality rules);
Fred C. Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 TEX. L. REV. 335, 365 (1994)
(rejecting the argument that state ethics rules may not be preempted by federal law); see also Cramton et al., supra note 24, at 799–801 (criticizing the
Washington bar opinion).
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A. LIMITS IMPOSED BY OTHER ETHICS PROVISIONS
Mandatory provisions of the codes may limit the discretion
granted to lawyers under a permissive rule. For example, the
fee rule provides that a “lawyer may . . . contract with a client
for a reasonable contingent fee.”102 This seems to suggest that
so long as the size of a proposed contingency fee is reasonable
given the expected recovery and risk of non-recovery, lawyers
may require a contingent fee as a condition of the representation. Courts and ethics committees, however, have interpreted
mandatory rules, such as the requirement in Model Rule 1.5
that a lawyer “not make an agreement for . . . an unreasonable
fee,”103 as limiting the lawyer’s ability to insist on a contingent
fee. The ABA ethics committee relied upon the predecessor version of Model Rule 1.5 and opined that “[a] lawyer normally has
an obligation to offer a prospective client an alternative fee arrangement before accepting a matter on a contingent fee basis.”104 Building on this interpretation, In re Fallers held
squarely that despite the discretionary language in the rules,
courts may overrule a lawyer’s decision to charge a contingent
fee.105
Similarly, mandatory rules arguably constrain a lawyer’s
discretion under Model Rule 2.1 to refer to non-legal considerations “such as moral, economic, social and political factors” in
rendering legal advice.106 Irma Russell has suggested that the
permissive provision is limited by another portion of the same
rule that states “a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice.”107 Russell maintains that, when references to non-legal considerations are necessary elements of “candid advice,” a lawyer must include

102. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(i)(2) (2006).
103. Id. R. 1.5(a). Of course, Model Rule 1.8 already includes a reasonableness limitation, but that limitation arguably refers only to the size of the contingent fee (on a forward-looking basis), not whether a contingent fee arrangement in and of itself constitutes a reasonable fee under the particular
circumstances. See id. R. 1.8(i)(2).
104. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof ’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 86-1521
(1986) (emphasis omitted). The committee built on this gloss to conclude that
when a client has the funds to pay a fixed fee, the lawyer should offer alternative fee arrangements and allow the client to make the choice. See id.
105. See 889 P.2d 20, 21 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).
106. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2006).
107. Irma S. Russell, Keeping the Wheels on the Wagon: Observations on
Issues of Legal Ethics for Lawyers Representing Business Organizations, 3
WYO. L. REV. 513, 521 (2003).
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them.108 Larry Gantt has argued even more broadly that lawyers’ permissive authority to counsel clients concerning nonlegal considerations is constrained by a host of other rules, including those governing competence, confidentiality, conflicts of
interest, and allocation of decision making.109 Gantt concludes
that to determine whether lawyers are required to provide
counseling under Model Rule 2.1, they must “look beyond the
permissive language in the text.”110
These examples raise an interpretive question. When a
mandatory rule conflicts with a permissive rule, which trumps?
In some cases, a code’s comments may resolve this question.
For example, Model Rule 8.3 requires lawyers to report certain
misconduct of other lawyers,111 and Model Rule 4.1 requires
lawyers to disclose material “necessary to avoid assisting a
criminal or fraudulent act by a client,”112 but both include caveats for information that is protected by the confidentiality provisions of Model Rule 1.6.113 Model Rule 1.6, in turn, includes
several discretionary exceptions to confidentiality114 which
must be read in light of the mandatory aspects of Model Rules
8.3 and 4.1. A comment to Model Rule 1.6 indicates that when
both the mandatory rules and the permissive confidentiality
exceptions apply, the mandatory obligations override the lawyer’s discretion not to disclose.115 In jurisdictions in which the
108. See id. at 521–22 (“[T]he lawyer who bites his tongue rather than
voice the unpleasant argument against a client’s course of action fails more
than his own conscience; he fails to fulfill the foundational duty of providing
candid legal advice.”). It might equally be argued, however, that the mandatory provision requires candid advice exclusively about legal considerations, so
that the decision whether to refer to non-legal factors is always discretionary.
109. See Larry O. Natt Gantt, II, More Than Lawyers: The Legal and Ethical Implications of Counseling Clients on Nonlegal Considerations, 18 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 365, 388–97 (2005); see also Green, supra note 82, at 49–50
(giving an example of where, “in order to address the [client’s] question competently, a lawyer must identify relevant non-legal considerations”).
110. Gantt, supra note 109, at 419–20.
111. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (2006).
112. Id. R. 4.1(b).
113. See id. (requiring disclosure “to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6”); id. R. 8.3(c)
(“This Rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by
Rule 1.6.”).
114. See id. R. 1.6(b).
115. See id. R. 1.6 cmt. 12. Likewise, Model Rule 3.3(b), which requires a
lawyer to disclose a person’s intent to engage in a crime or fraud during litigation, is meant to trump any provision making disclosures of client wrongdoing
discretionary. See id. R. 1.6 cmt. 15 (“Rule 3.3 . . . requires disclosure in some
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professional code does not include clarifying comments, institutions charged with interpreting the code (e.g., courts and ethics
committees) must determine whether the mandatory or permissive rule takes priority.116
This last point highlights an important fact: limits inherent in some of the codes’ permissive provisions may only become apparent as the provisions are fleshed out by ethics committees or judicial opinions interpreting the rules. Constraints
on lawyers’ ability to demand contingent fees did not appear
likely until the ABA ethics committee issued Informal Opinion
86-1521.117 Potential limits on the discretion to withdraw can
only be ascertained with any degree of certainty after courts
implement their supervisory authority over withdrawal and
specify the factors that are germane.118 Nevertheless, in the
end, permissive provisions that contain the substantive and
procedural limitations described above cannot be conceptualized as purely discretionary. Realistically viewed, they contain
explicit and implicit constraints that lawyers initially may not
perceive or understand.
B. LIMITS IMPOSED BY OTHER LAW OR LAWMAKERS
Some discretionary rules limit their grants of discretion by
delegating the right to constrain discretion to other lawmakers.
For example, Model Rule 1.16, which permits lawyers to withdraw from a representation in specified circumstances, explicitly provides that lawyers in litigation must first obtain the
permission of the tribunal.119 Although a few courts have regarded this limitation as pro forma and have treated the lawyer’s discretion to withdraw as absolute,120 most courts under-

circumstances regardless of whether such disclosure is permitted by this
Rule.”).
116. See, e.g., N.Y. State Bar, Op. 781 (2004) (opining that where a client
has perpetrated a fraud on a tribunal, the lawyer must withdraw fraudulent
submissions because correction of false submissions, although discretionary
under the confidentiality rules, is mandatory under the rule requiring rectification of frauds on the court).
117. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof ’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 861521 (1986).
118. See infra text accompanying note 125.
119. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(c) (2006).
120. See, e.g., Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co. v. Intercounty Nat’l Title Ins. Co.,
310 F.3d 537, 541 (7th Cir. 2002) (reversing a trial court’s refusal to allow
withdrawal on the basis that the prerequisites for discretionary withdrawal
under the professional rules had been triggered).
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stand the limitation as authorizing courts to overrule the lawyer’s exercise of discretion on the basis of independent interests
(e.g., judicial efficiency).121 Similarly, the codes (at least for disciplinary purposes) appear to recognize that lawyers’ discretion
to make certain disclosures122 is governed by the obligation to
comply with other law and rules of court.123 Conflict-of-interest
rules allowing lawyers to accept certain waivers arguably contemplate that lawyers will exercise that option in light of their
fiduciary obligations.124
The import of these limitations is unclear. The drafters
may simply be recognizing the obvious: courts have the power
to limit lawyers’ discretion by, for example, denying them the
right to withdraw from a representation or compelling them to
make unauthorized disclosures.125 If that is the case, the draft121. See Haines v. Liggett Group, 814 F. Supp. 414, 425–26 (D.N.J. 1993)
(overruling the requests of lawyers to withdraw even though it was clear that
the lawyers would indeed suffer severe, unexpected financial hardship in continuing the representation); Cherokee Nation v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 15,
17 (1998) (holding that even when the conditions for withdrawal under the
professional rules are satisfied, courts may force a lawyer to continue the representation if necessary to preserve judicial efficiency); Billings, Cunningham,
Morgan & Boatwright, P.A. v. Isom, 701 So. 2d 1271, 1272 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1997) (rejecting withdrawal seemingly authorized by the professional rules on
the basis that the client’s independent interests outweighed those of the law
firm—the firm had represented the client for a long time, and substitute counsel would be difficult to find); see also Lindsay R. Goldstein, Note, A View from
the Bench: Why Judges Fail to Protect Trust and Confidence in the LawyerClient Relationship—An Analysis and Proposal for Reform, 73 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2665, 2699–2704 (2005) (comparing courts’ responses in criminal and
civil cases to withdrawal motions predicated on a breakdown in the attorneyclient relationship).
122. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(6) (2006) (“A lawyer
may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent
the lawyer believes reasonably necessary . . . to comply with other law or a
court order.”).
123. See id. R. 3.4(c) (“A lawyer shall not . . . knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal, except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists . . . .”).
124. See, e.g., id. R. 1.7(b) (allowing conflict waivers in specified circumstances); see also Zacharias, supra note 88, at 412–23 (discussing a lawyer’s
obligations in evaluating client conflict waivers).
125. For example, some commentators have suggested that the codes reflect a different view of the appropriate contours of confidentiality than the
judicial view. See Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70
N.C. L. REV. 1389, 1409–47 (1992) (comparing the separate visions of the bar
and judiciary regarding attorney-client secrecy); Fred C. Zacharias, The Fallacy That Attorney-Client Privilege Has Been Eroded: Ramifications and Lessons for the Bar, PROF. LAW., 1999 Symposium Issue, at 39, 40 (discussing the
bar’s failure “to accept that its vision of appropriate secrecy . . . diverges from
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ers are not affirmatively inviting courts to regulate lawyer discretion (and may even prefer that courts not do so), but are acknowledging that when courts choose to impose obligations,
lawyers will not be disciplined for complying. Alternatively,
these provisions might reflect the drafters’ recognition that
courts are in a superior position to make contemporaneous, objective determinations regarding whether or not lawyers should
be allowed to withdraw or whether disclosures should be made
in a particular situation. If that is the intent, court-imposed restrictions are consistent with both the letter and spirit of the
rules’ grant of discretion.
C. IMPLICATIONS OF THE LIMITS ON DISCRETION
That the codes themselves may contemplate limits on lawyers’ discretion affects how other lawmakers should regard permissive rules. Most obviously, when the codes impose limits,
there is no inherent reason for other lawmakers to forebear
from enforcing them.126 Thus, Russell’s and Gantt’s conclusions
that mandatory rules sometimes require lawyers to counsel
their clients about non-legal considerations might well justify
the imposition of civil liability (e.g., for professional negligence)
when a lawyer has failed to discuss non-legal considerations, or
may justify the promulgation of administrative regulations that
require such counseling. Similarly, insofar as permissive rules
accede to other law and invite external lawmakers to develop
limits, there is no reason why external regulators should decline the invitation. They would not be encroaching on lawyer
discretion so much as reinforcing a limitation recognized by the
drafters themselves.
Arguably, when code drafters include limitations on permissive authority that they have granted to lawyers, the drafters are signaling that their commitment to informed selfregulation is relatively weak. For example, the grant of occasional discretion to reveal or keep secret client misconduct
seems to be trumped by the requirement that lawyers correct
the vision of judges evaluating claims of privilege”); Fred C. Zacharias, Harmonizing Privilege and Confidentiality, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 69, 71–75 (1999)
[hereinafter Zacharias, Harmonizing Privilege and Confidentiality] (explaining the different conceptions of secrecy of the bar and judiciary).
126. That is not to say that ordinary constraints on other lawmakers might
not cause them to forebear, but rather that the mere existence of permissive
language in the ethics codes should not serve as an impediment to external
regulation.
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their clients’ and witnesses’ false testimony and remedy other
frauds on the court.127 The limitation on discretion highlights
the drafters’ conclusion that the public interest in the integrity
of judicial proceedings outweighs the drafters’ general preference for allowing lawyers to make individual decisions regarding disclosure of client confidences. Given the weakness of the
commitment to lawyer autonomy in the adjudicative context,
external lawmakers might reasonably infer that, even from the
drafters’ perspective, other public policy considerations can justify further limits.
Suppose, however, that a code does not expressly limit a
permissive rule. Should other lawmakers respect selfregulation as the preferable regulatory alternative and forebear
from imposing requirements or liability within the area that
the rules leave to lawyers’ discretion? Any argument to this effect presupposes that by granting lawyers options, the code
drafters made a normative judgment to which they believed
other lawmakers should defer. In fact, however, code drafters
develop permissive provisions for a variety of reasons—some
normative, some not. The drafters’ expectations of whether external lawmakers will ratify the discretion delegated by a disciplinary rule may well depend upon the reasons why the codes
have emphasized discretion in that particular rule. As discussed below, it is not ordinarily obvious from the face of a rule
why the codes have permitted lawyers to choose their actions,
nor is it always clear whether the drafters’ justification for according discretion was meant to have implications for external
lawmakers.
III. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PERMISSIVE RULES
Code drafters sometimes adopt rules that accord lawyers
discretion because they believe that to be the correct approach
and hope that other lawmakers will agree with, or accede to,
the drafters’ normative judgment.128 In other instances, the
127. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3), (b)–(c) (2006).
128. As Susan Koniak has pointed out, sometimes the drafters clearly intend to establish the legal standard, fully expecting or hoping that courts and
other law-making institutions will accept their approach. See Koniak, supra
note 125, at 1411. The bar’s vision of the appropriate substantive law may,
however, conflict with the view of other law-making institutions. Id. The normative view underlying the limited discretionary future harm exception to attorney-client confidentiality, for example, seems to be inconsistent with the
views underlying both agency law, which allows agents to disclose to protect
the superior interests of third parties, and judicial exceptions to attorney-
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drafters anticipate and accept that external lawmakers may
reach different conclusions about the appropriate rule. That
expectation may stem from the debatable nature of the issue or
from the fact that the code drafters have limited the scope of
their inquiry and the interests they have considered. As a consequence, after the fact, it often is both possible to posit a range
of explanations for a given discretionary rule and impossible to
ascertain a clear intention on the drafters’ part to preempt
other law.
A. THE NORMATIVE JUDGMENT THAT THE PERMISSIVE
APPROACH IS CORRECT ACROSS-THE-BOARD
Permissive ethics rules reflect a variety of normative
judgments that the code drafters may believe external lawmakers should follow. First, the range of situations that a rule implicates may both call for a balancing of interests and involve
interests that individual lawyers can best understand and accommodate. Second, lawyers’ personal interests in being able to
select their conduct may warrant respect. Third, in situations
in which lawyers must make difficult choices, the drafters may
believe lawyers are entitled to deference, or room for error,
when in hindsight their decisions prove to be wrong or questionable. Finally, the drafters may regard a discretionary rule
as preferable simply because it is the lesser of two (or more)
evils.
The permissive future harm exceptions to attorney-client
confidentiality129 typify ethics rules that can be explained on
the basis of the drafters’ belief that lawyers should be allowed
to balance moral and systemic considerations through case-bycase decision making. Whether a lawyer should disclose a client’s confidences to prevent or rectify serious harm to a third
party when permitted to do so arguably depends upon a balance among client rights, society’s interest in the operation of
the legal system (which lawyers have an interest in protecting),
and moral or other societal considerations (which lawyers also
have an interest in serving). How to strike the balance turns on
the relative importance of preserving a client’s trust, the nature
client privilege. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 cmt. f (1958)
(“An agent is privileged to reveal information confidentially acquired by him in
the course of his agency in the protection of a superior interest of himself or of
a third person.”); see also Zacharias & Green, supra note 39, at 57–60 (discussing judicial interpretations of attorney-client secrecy requirements).
129. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2006).
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and seriousness of the risk to third parties, and the extent to
which the client truly meant to entrust a confidence. A rule authorizing lawyers to decide the disclosure issue on a casesensitive basis may be the best way to implement the normative judgment that balancing is appropriate and that lawyers
are in a good (perhaps the best) position to strike the balance.
Code drafters may prefer the permissive approach to an underor over-inclusive alternative that would require lawyers always
to disclose in certain categories of cases and never to disclose in
others.130
Other discretionary rules seem to focus on the rights of
lawyers themselves, deeming lawyers’ interests paramount and
therefore according lawyers autonomy to decide whether or not
to promote those interests. This approach helps explain rules
permitting lawyers to counsel clients about moral and political
considerations131 and rules authorizing lawyers to withdraw
when a client wishes to take a “repugnant” position.132 In many
cases, client or public concerns may not provide a compelling
reason for requiring lawyers to withdraw or to advise clients
about non-legal factors. Yet individual lawyers may legitimately believe that the dictates of competence, conscience, or
their personal conception of the lawyer’s role warrants consideration of moral or political issues. The advice and withdrawal
rules appear to reflect the code drafters’ judgment that these
lawyers’ beliefs should be respected, at least to the extent of
protecting their ability to engage in moral or political counseling and to avoid personal participation in cases that offend
them. The permissive nature of the rules enables lawyers to

130. See generally J. Michael Callan & Harris David, Professional Responsibility and the Duty of Confidentiality: Disclosure of Client Misconduct in an
Adversary System, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 332, 355–56 (1976) (discussing rationales for permissive disclosure of clients’ intended crimes); Leslie C. Levin,
Testing the Radical Experiment: A Study of Lawyer Response to Clients Who
Intend to Harm Others, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 81, 101 (1994) (same). In contrast,
mandatory disclosure rules drafted by other lawmakers—such as the proposed
SEC regulations implementing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act—reflect the opposite
normative judgment. Their premise is either that balancing is inappropriate
or that lawyers are not uniquely situated to determine the appropriate accommodation of interests.
131. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2006).
132. Id. R. 1.16(b)(4). The future harm exceptions have similarly been explained by some as respecting a lawyer’s autonomy. See, e.g., Harry I. Subin,
The Lawyer as Superego: Disclosure of Client Confidences to Prevent Harm, 70
IOWA L. REV. 1091, 1175 (1985) (advocating a mandatory disclosure rule, but
acknowledging that such a rule would infringe lawyers’ autonomy).
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address concerns of conscience to the extent they deem it appropriate to raise them, but at the same time maintains the
codes’ key elements of client-orientation, role-differentiation,
and zealous advocacy.
Another situation in which code drafters may predicate a
permissive rule on normative considerations that they expect
other lawmakers to accept occurs when the drafters impose
particularly difficult decision-making responsibilities but do not
believe that an attorney deserves sanction for implementing
those responsibilities in good faith if the attorney’s decision
proves faulty. In other words, fairness may require that in
some situations lawyers be accorded a measure of leeway, or
wriggle room, pursuant to which they can make their best
judgments free from fear of punishment. This understanding
probably underlies rules allowing lawyers to decline to present
suspected perjury in civil cases.133 In the absence of discretion,
lawyers would be forbidden to introduce testimony they know
to be false but be required to introduce helpful testimony that
they merely believe is false; the propriety of the lawyer’s conduct would turn on the lawyer’s actual knowledge, and there
would be no room for error. When it is unclear whether the information in a lawyer’s possession rises to the level of knowledge or to mere suspicion that the client’s proposed testimony
will be false, any decision by the lawyer creates considerable
disciplinary risk. The permissive ethics provision arguably obviates that risk by according the lawyer discretion in close
cases.
Finally, some permissive provisions may be explicable not
based on the affirmative utility of discretion but simply as being preferable to the likely alternatives. For example, as described in the Introduction, the ABA faced pressure following
the collapse of Enron and other corporate scandals to adopt
mandatory disclosure obligations, but responded by expanding
its permissive provisions. Proponents argued, among other
things, that permissive disclosure is preferable to mandatory
reporting because clients who are aware of a disclosure obliga-

133. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) (2006). It has
been noted that the future harm exceptions to confidentiality similarly obviate
the need to decide on which side of the line a case falls. See Donald L. Burnett,
Jr., The Proposed Rules of Professional Conduct: Critical Concerns for Military
Lawyers, ARMY LAW., Feb. 1987, at 19, 23 (noting difficult decisions under
proposed military rules of professional conduct, under which disclosure would
be mandatory to avert certain harms, and otherwise would be impermissible).
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tion will be less willing to retain and confide in lawyers134 and
because risk-averse lawyers will withdraw from representation
at the first hint of client misconduct, thereby denying clients
wise and informed counsel.135 The proponents evidently persuaded the rule-drafting body that the permissive approach
better supports the lawyer’s role in promoting compliance with
the law.
The justifications discussed above all reflect decisions by
the code drafters that, on balance, discretion is the preferable
approach to regulating a particular area of professional conduct. Such judgments ordinarily imply a belief that other lawmakers should reach the same conclusion.136 Nevertheless, the
terms of permissive rules seldom make clear whether the rules
are based on these kinds of considerations.
By way of example, consider yet again the future harm exceptions to confidentiality. One might argue that their purpose
is less to implement a normative judgment about the complexity of balancing competing interests than to promote the perceived interest of particular lawyers in “bring[ing] their personal conscience and morality to bear in deciding whether
to . . . prevent criminal activity by a client.”137 Alternatively,
their purpose may be to provide some margin of error in the
space between those situations in which lawyers must disclose
client confidences (e.g., when necessary to avoid assisting a client’s crime or fraud)138 and those situations where lawyers may
not disclose intended client wrongdoing (e.g., when it is not sufficiently certain that the client’s conduct is criminal or fraudulent, that substantial harm will result, or that the lawyer’s services are implicated).139 As discussed below in Parts III.B and
134. Letter from ABA to SEC, supra note 25 (arguing that a proposed requirement that lawyers notify the SEC of withdrawal and disaffirm specific
documents would undermine corporations’ trust in their lawyers); Letter from
the Bd. of Dirs. of the Am. Corporate Counsel Ass’n to Jonathan G. Katz,
Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Dec. 18, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/
rules/proposed/s74502/bnagler1.htm [hereinafter Letter from ACCA to SEC]
(same).
135. See Letter from ACCA to SEC, supra note 134.
136. That does not mean, however, that lawmakers always agree. Indeed,
in some instances, code drafters have adopted ethics regulations for the very
purpose of influencing or contradicting contrary substantive law. See Koniak,
supra note 125, at 1411.
137. Steven C. Krane, Don’t Tell Anyone (Our Confidentiality Rules Are
Changing), N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N J., May 2005, at 28, 29.
138. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1(b) (2006).
139. See id. R. 1.6(b)(2)–(3).
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III.C, the provisions might equally be explained on the basis of
separate reasons that do not reflect any normative judgment to
which the drafters would want, or expect, other lawmakers to
defer.
B. THE NORMATIVE JUDGMENT THAT THE PERMISSIVE
APPROACH IS PREFERABLE FOR DISCIPLINARY PURPOSES BUT
NOT NECESSARILY FOR OTHER LEGAL PURPOSES
Code drafters might adopt permissive ethics provisions assuming that they reflect the preferable disciplinary standard,
yet nonetheless anticipate that other lawmakers may appropriately set regulatory standards mandating or forbidding specific
conduct within the area of discretion identified by the ethics
code. There are a variety of reasons for code drafters to adopt
this approach.
One set of rationales stems from the difficulty of drawing
bright-line rules that cover all situations lawyers are likely to
confront. Consider, again, the confidentiality exceptions permitting disclosure of client wrongdoing. There are strong policy
justifications for and against these exceptions. On the one
hand, clients’ interests in secrecy and loyalty and the legal system’s interest in promoting future clients’ trust in lawyers favor confidentiality. On the other hand, society’s immediate interest in preventing misconduct often favors disclosure. The
appropriate balance in any case may well depend upon the nature of the misconduct and its effect, the likelihood that it will
occur without disclosure or be prevented with disclosure, the
impact of disclosure on the client, and other fact-sensitive considerations. Bright-line rules—for example, requiring lawyers
to report a client’s intent to commit specified crimes of violence
but forbidding lawyers to disclose other intended wrongdoing—
arguably are both over- and under-inclusive; in at least some
cases, violent crimes should not be reported and other wrongdoing should be reported.140

140. Consider, for example, two clients. The first tells the lawyer, “I’m going to punch my neighbor in the nose for killing my dog,” while the second—a
client in a routine real estate closing—confides that he plans to launder money
for Al Qaeda. Disclosing the first client’s confidence may destroy the working
relationship the lawyer has with the client in the separate representation, and
the warning to the neighbor may add little to what the neighbor already
knows. The importance to society of disclosing the second client’s confidence,
in contrast, may outweigh the need to preserve the client’s trust.

GREEN_ZACHARIAS_5FMT

2006]

PERMISSIVE ETHICS RULES

12/22/2006 10:56:08 AM

303

Code drafters might reasonably conclude that according
lawyers discretion to make appropriate decisions in individual
cases is a better alternative than binding lawyers to an inflexible categorical mandate. This drafting choice, however, may not
reflect an expectation that other lawmakers will defer to lawyer
discretion. It may simply reflect a judgment that reasonable
observers can take opposite positions on the disputed issue. The
fact that the code takes one approach does not mean that the
drafters would not accept that external lawmakers might reach
the conclusion—perhaps even the correct conclusion—that a
mandatory rule is preferable.
More significantly, the drafters’ conclusion that only a
permissive standard can adequately address the plethora of potential cases is perfectly consistent with the expectation that
other lawmakers may adopt mandatory rules for subcategories
of cases in which concrete standards make sense. A state legislature, for example, might adopt a reporting law that requires
all professionals, including lawyers, to report ongoing incidents
of serious child abuse.141 Although it is conceivable that the
drafters of the permissive ethics rule would conclude that lawyers should have discretion not to report child abuse, it is
equally conceivable that the drafters would agree that disclosure should be made in that subclass of cases.
Likewise, a rule permitting lawyers to counsel clients
about moral and political considerations142 may be based on the
drafters’ judgment that such counseling is sometimes appropriate and sometimes not, and that no uniformly correct approach
can be encapsulated in a single rule. The conflict-of-interest
rules, in allowing lawyers to accept particular conflict waivers,143 arguably reflect the drafters’ understanding that sometimes clients who understand the consequences will benefit by
waiving the conflict, while in other cases lawyers’ refusal to accept waivers will best serve the clients’ interests.144 Neither of
these permissive rules, however, eliminates the possibility that
the drafters would accept a legislative conclusion that lawyers
should act in a particular way in subcategories of cases.145
141. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-353 (2005); OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.005–
.010 (2003).
142. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2006).
143. See, e.g., id. R. 1.7.
144. See Zacharias, supra note 88, at 412–23 (discussing the reasons for
honoring and for overriding client consent to conflicted representation).
145. For example, Congress has adopted legislation that precludes conflict
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A second set of reasons why code drafters might adopt a
permissive rule yet accept the possibility that alternative lawmakers will produce mandatory or prohibitive standards derives from the limited interests that the professional codes
typically address. Most ethics regulation focuses on particular
systemic concerns, including client protection, enhancing public
trust and respect for the profession, assuring that legitimate
third-party interests are safeguarded (in at least a procedural
sense), promoting the operation of the adversary system, maintaining efficient judicial administration, and (occasionally) implementing more general societal interests. Code drafters often
adopt permissive rules that, in their view, properly balance the
interests that the codes address, while still assuming that other
lawmakers might adjust the balance when taking other considerations into account.
A permissive exception to confidentiality, for example, may
reflect a judgment that the lawyer should be given a choice
about how to proceed, based on the assessment that this approach best accommodates client, third-party, and societal interests in disclosure. That conclusion does not, however, gainsay the possibility that societal interests in mitigating
widespread corporate misconduct at a particular time in history
might justify an SEC regulation that mandates disclosures by
corporate attorneys.
Indeed, a permissive ethics rule may reflect the code drafters’ indifference to how lawyers act, at least with respect to the
interests that the ethics code is intended to further. This attitude helps explain the rule permitting contingent fees. Outside
the matrimonial and criminal contexts, code drafters may perceive no ethics-based interest that would justify either compelling or forbidding a lawyer to represent a client for a contingent
fee. That does not mean, however, that society should be power-

waivers in the bankruptcy context. See 11 U.S.C. § 327(a) (2000). A legislature
might also reasonably adopt bright-line rules forbidding lawyers to accept conflict waivers from minors or mentally disabled persons. In the counseling
situation, it might be appropriate for a legislature to insist upon moral counseling when a corporate client determines that its product threatens to harm
some users (or employees involved in the manufacturing process) but that the
benefit of the product outweighs the potential liability costs. Cf. Gantt, supra
note 109, at 419–20 (“[A]ttorneys may be ethically obligated at times either to
advise clients on the nonlegal issues that relate to the legal issues in the representation or, at a minimum, to raise the nonlegal issues with their clients
and instruct them to seek expert advice in those other fields.”).
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less to conclude that in particular types of litigation, limits are
necessary to protect clients from exploitation.146
Alternatively, one can conceive of situations in which code
drafters view the competing ethics interests as being in complete equipoise and therefore allow lawyers’ personal interests
to tip the balance. This approach might explain aspects of rules
allowing lawyers to withdraw from representation, for example
when a client uses (or has used) a lawyer’s services to commit a
fraud.147 The interests in protecting the public and in promoting public confidence in the profession compete against client
interests in confidentiality and zealous representation. To the
extent the code drafters determine that neither set of interests
is dominant, they may deem it fairest to allow each lawyer to
decide whether to continue the representation in light of the
lawyer’s own interests.148
Insofar as a grant of discretion is a product of indifference,
the code drafters presumably do not mean to supersede alternative regulation that narrows the lawyer’s discretion in order
to promote interests different from those underlying the ethics
codes.149 The rulemakers may even invite external lawmakers
146. For example, Congress might have adopted legislation forbidding representation of parties on a contingent fee basis before the September 11 claims
tribunal, based on a legislative view that the claimants had adequate access to
lawyers who would competently represent them at lower cost for a fixed or
hourly fee and that, insofar as possible, the awards should be preserved for the
benefit of the claimants, not their lawyers. Such legislation would not necessarily have been inconsistent with the judgments underlying the general rule
permitting contingent fees. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(i)(2)
(2006); see also Assistance Program Under the 9/11 Heroes Stamp Act of 2001,
70 Fed. Reg. 43,214, 43,215 (July 26, 2005) (to be codified at 44 C.F.R. pt. 153);
Elizabeth M. Schneider, Grief, Procedure, and Justice: The September 11th
Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 457, 496 n.219 (2003) (citing Kenneth
Feinberg, Presentation at Brooklyn/Cardozo Faculty Workshop on Ethical,
Economic, and Social Issues in Mass Torts (Nov. 4, 2003)) (observing that
when families of those who died in the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks
were represented on a contingent fee basis, the fee was ordinarily eight to ten
percent of the recovery).
147. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b)(2)–(3) (2006).
148. The lawyer’s own interests may include, for example, the lawyer’s
business interest in continuing lucrative engagements, on the one hand, or the
interest in avoiding civil liability and preserving a reputation for professional
integrity, on the other.
149. It is important to note the difference between the normative judgment
that fairness requires a sanction-free zone, on the one hand, and purely selfserving judgments on the part of the bar, on the other. Rules that provide a
zone of discretion as a means of enabling or facilitating the exercise of lawyers’
responsibilities to clients or the system reflect a normative judgment that a
safe harbor for lawyers helps the system operate appropriately. Self-serving
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to restrict the lawyer’s discretion. Standard withdrawal rules,
for example, identify circumstances in which lawyers may terminate representation, but specifically note that courts have
supplemental interests in avoiding undue delay or expense
arising from substitution of counsel. These rules contemplate
that when a lawyer seeks judicial permission to withdraw, the
ruling court will take its own institutional interests into account. A denial of leave to withdraw is not inconsistent with
the judgment underlying the permissive withdrawal provisions,
at least insofar as the court is implementing institutional concerns that the ethics rule did not resolve.
One can interpret the permissive withdrawal rules in yet
another way that reflects both a normative judgment by the
drafters and an acceptance of the possibility that other lawmaking institutions may disagree. Code drafters know that at
least some of their rules will, or may, co-exist with inconsistent
judicial or legislative requirements, with each standard governing decision making in the sphere controlled by the rulemaking institution. Thus, for example, code drafters seem to
envision conflict-of-interest rules as governing disciplinary
cases, but judicial disqualification standards as governing lawyer conduct within litigation.150 One can conceptualize attorrules, which sometimes include immunity from sanctions for improper conduct, simply seek to confer a benefit upon the bar.
Of course, some rules can be viewed as fitting either category. For example, the permissive future harm exceptions to attorney-client confidentiality
facilitate lawyers’ ability to make the difficult decision to turn against the client, but they also arguably provide a shield for lawyers who fail to disclose
confidences in order to preserve third-party interests. Cf. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 54(1) (2000) (“A lawyer is not liable under § 48 or § 49 for any action or inaction the lawyer reasonably believed to be required by law, including a professional rule.”). Rules allowing
lawyers to counsel clients regarding ongoing or planned illegal conduct purport to relieve lawyers of uncertainty in determining whether their counsel
constitutes unlawfully assisting the clients in the commission of the crime, but
they ostensibly provide a similar shield. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 9 (2006) (“Nor does the fact that a client uses [a lawyer’s] advice in a course of action that is criminal or fraudulent of itself make a lawyer
a party to the course of action.”).
150. See, e.g., N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, Comm. on Prof ’l Ethics, Op. 720 (1999)
(“The standard employed in ruling on disqualification motions is not invariably the same as the standard under the applicable disciplinary rules. In some
cases, courts will decline to disqualify a law firm, even though its representation would appear to be forbidden by the disciplinary rules, in light of the client’s interest in preserving an ongoing . . . relation with its chosen counsel and
other considerations of fairness and economy.”); see also Green, supra note 11,
at 74–83 (describing courts’ development of disqualification doctrine inde-
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ney-client secrecy standards in the same way. The code drafters
have a normative view concerning appropriate secrecy; professional confidentiality rules control lawyer discipline. But the
drafters also seem to acknowledge that other institutions, especially courts, have a narrower normative view (reflected in attorney-client privilege standards) which takes precedence once
lawyers become involved in litigation.151
Finally, code drafters might adopt a discretionary approach
simply because they despair of resolving a controversial issue
for whole categories of cases in which reasonable observers differ about the correct approach. The debate regarding the appropriate conduct of lawyers when they believe (but do not
know) that a client’s testimony is false has long divided the
bar.152 A rule leaving the decision to lawyers153 not only allows
individual attorneys to resolve diverse cases differently, but
also avoids having proponents of one arguably legitimate normative view impose their beliefs on proponents of the opposite,
but also legitimate, view. The decision to leave the issue to individual decision making is normative in the sense that code
drafters conclude that individual decisions will be at least as
valid as a categorical decision encapsulated in a rule, yet it is
also non-normative in the sense that it fails to adopt any solution as correct. A decision by alternative lawmakers who believe that they can reach a correct conclusion on the issue
therefore cannot be viewed as inconsistent with the normative
judgments of the professional rulemakers.

pendently from the conflict rules).
151. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(6) (2006) (authorizing lawyers to disclose confidences in order “to comply with other law or
a court order”).
152. The most pointed example of this debate was the work of Monroe
Freedman in the mid-1960’s and the responses of David Bress and John
Noonan. Compare Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the
Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV.
1469, 1478 (1966) (discussing, inter alia, defense lawyers’ obligations when a
client wishes to commit perjury), with David G. Bress, Professional Ethics in
Criminal Trials: A View of Defense Counsel’s Responsibility, 64 MICH. L. REV.
1493, 1494–97 (1966) (disagreeing with Monroe Freedman’s resolutions of “the
three hardest [ethical] questions” for criminal defense attorneys), and John T.
Noonan, The Purposes of Advocacy and the Limits of Confidentiality, 64 MICH.
L. REV. 1485, 1487–92 (1966) (responding to Freedman’s arguments in favor of
broad confidentiality).
153. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) (2006).

GREEN_ZACHARIAS_5FMT

308

12/22/2006 10:56:08 AM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[91:265

C. PROCEDURAL OR STOP-GAP JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PERMISSIVE
RULES
Thus far, we have considered only normative justifications
for permissive rules—decisions by code drafters to adopt a
permissive rule because they have a normative preference for
lawyer discretion. Permissive rules may be adopted for many
other reasons, however.
One can easily imagine situations in which code drafters
adopt permissive rules for practical reasons. Of course, when
doing so, code drafters ordinarily will make their best efforts to
define an appropriate ethics standard. Nevertheless, the code
drafters may be perfectly willing to defer to external lawmakers’ alternative resolutions of the issues. Indeed, the drafters
may even be attempting to codify or predict what they believe
to be the external lawmakers’ preferences. Under these circumstances, the code drafters should be prepared to cede authority
to the alternative regulatory institutions when those institutions adopt a contrary standard.
One important function of the legal ethics codes is to inform lawyers about the lawfulness and appropriateness of behavior.154 In adopting some permissive rules, code drafters perceive themselves merely as codifying155 or supplementing
existing legal standards.156 Other permissive rules seek to fill
gaps in the law157 or, as discussed below, clarify extra-code
standards.
Lawyers are particularly likely to be confused about how to
act when legal standards are ambiguous or in flux. Permissive
rules can serve the codes’ guidance function by advising the
practicing bar that conduct deemed improper under previous
legal standards or professional norms is becoming accepted. By
making the standard discretionary, code drafters either inform

154. See Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Codes, supra note 8, at 231–
32 (discussing the purposes of ethics codes).
155. See Munneke & Davis, supra note 9, at 42–43 (asserting that Model
Rule 1.9 is a codification of court-made law defining “the substantive standard
for successive conflicts of interest”).
156. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Codes, supra note 8, at 232 (noting that “drafters sometimes have attempted to supplement the substantive
law”).
157. See Munneke & Davis, supra note 9, at 43 (discussing Model Rule 1.5
as an example in which the codes recognize lawyers’ customary standard of
behavior in dividing fees).
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lawyers to look to the changing case law or suggest directly
that particular conduct is legal but remains controversial.
Perhaps the best examples are ethics rules that allow lawyers to accept contingent fees158 and to advance certain costs on
behalf of some litigants.159 When adopted, these rules addressed doubt about the propriety of such conduct that
stemmed from nineteenth- and early twentieth-century law
deeming activities promoting litigation to be improper champerty or barratry.160 With the due process161 and legal advertising162 revolutions came acceptance of the notion that behavior
by lawyers that informs the public and makes representation
more freely available to consumers of legal services can be
beneficial to society.163 Traditional restrictions on lawyer activities that served these ends—including restrictions on advertising, contingent fee representation, certain kinds of solicitation,
and providing financial support for class action litigation and
indigent plaintiffs—changed slowly, and some of these limitations remained on the books even as it became clear that courts
would no longer countenance them.164 The modern contingent

158. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(i)(2) (2006).
159. See, e.g., id. R. 1.8(e).
160. In other words, the earlier law deemed litigation to be a bad thing,
and financial devices that enabled lawyers to facilitate the filing of lawsuits
were to be discouraged. See R.D. Cox, Champerty as We Know It, 13 MEMP. ST.
U. L. REV. 139, 153 (1983) (“The common law . . . prohibited one from even encouraging a present or prospective plaintiff in his lawsuit, absent a justifying
relationship.”); Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Lawyers’ Contracts Is Different,
67 FORDHAM L. REV. 443, 473 (1998) (“[M]edieval society frowned on lawyers
marketing their services . . . . [I]t was the financing of litigation that was disquieting and prohibited.”).
161. See Zacharias, supra note 78, at 1318–20 (discussing the effects of the
due process revolution in criminal cases on the role of lawyers in civil litigation).
162. See J. GORDON HYLTON, PROFESSIONAL VALUES AND INDIVIDUAL
AUTONOMY: THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND LAWYER ADVERTISING
36–41 (1998) (discussing the shift in legal doctrine governing legal advertising); Fred C. Zacharias, What Lawyers Do When Nobody’s Watching: Legal
Advertising as a Case Study of the Impact of Underenforced Professional Rules,
87 IOWA L. REV. 971, 995–96 (2002) (discussing the history of lawyer advertising regulation).
163. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 449 (1978) (allowing limited regulation of lawyers’ in-person solicitation of clients); Bates v.
State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383–84 (1977) (finding lawyer advertising to
be constitutionally protected).
164. See Zacharias, supra note 162, at 996 n.116 (discussing the regulatory
resistance to changes in advertising and solicitation rules).
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fee and financial support rules served notice on lawyers of the
change in legal standards.
Similarly, rules allowing lawyers to inform the courts
about known client perjury were adopted in the wake of a
heated debate about whether lawyers must honor confidentiality, on the one hand, or their disclosure obligations as officers of
the court, on the other.165 Lawyers’ legal obligations in the perjury context were unclear and, as a result, the early codes also
remained ambiguous on the issue.166 The Supreme Court’s decision in Nix v. Whiteside, however, tipped the balance.167 In
that case, the Supreme Court held that a defendant has no
right to commit perjury and therefore no right to assistance in
doing so.168 Nix by itself did not change the law, for the Court
had no jurisdiction to revise state ethics codes. The Nix decision
itself purported to apply Iowa’s standards.169 Nevertheless, the
Court’s pronouncements signaled that requiring lawyers to disclose perjurious clients’ confidences was a legitimate, constitu165. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
166. In Nix v. Whiteside, for example, the court of appeals concluded that
the defendant’s lawyer had failed to provide effective assistance of counsel
when he threatened that if the client testified falsely, the lawyer would disclose to the court that the client had done so. See 744 F.2d 1323, 1330–31 (8th
Cir. 1985). But the Supreme Court squarely disagreed, holding that a defendant has no right to commit perjury and therefore no right to assistance in doing so. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 168 (1986). This disagreement reflected the ambiguity of the then-prevailing codes of ethics. The Model Code,
which was still the model for many states’ rules, prohibited lawyers from
“[k]nowingly us[ing] perjured testimony” but did not authorize them to disclose after-the-fact that a client had committed perjury because the confidentiality duty took precedence. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR
7-102 (1980). Further, many courts believed that the criminal defendant’s
right to testify meant that, to comply with the prohibition of presenting false
testimony, lawyers were required to offer their clients’ false testimony in the
form of a “narrative.” The then-existing Model Rules, in contrast, did not allow
a lawyer to disclose a client’s intent to commit perjury, but did require lawyers
to remedy past frauds upon a tribunal. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
R. 1.6(b), 3.3(a) (1983).
167. See 475 U.S 157 (1986).
168. See id. at 163 (rejecting the Eighth Circuit’s holding that the defendant’s lawyer failed to provide effective assistance of counsel when he threatened that he would inform the court if the defendant testified falsely).
169. Ironically, the Supreme Court misread the professional rules, stating
that the Iowa code and the Model Code both provided that an “attorney’s revelation of his client’s perjury to the court is a professionally responsible and acceptable response to the conduct of a client who has actually given perjured
testimony.” Id. at 170. These codes, however, only forbade a lawyer’s knowing
use of perjured testimony, but did not necessarily allow disclosure of perjury
after the fact. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102 (1980).
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tional approach,170 and as a result many states adopted such a
requirement.171 The ABA’s promulgation of a model rule that
implemented Nix’s approach, allowing lawyers to disclose client
perjury in criminal cases, foreshadowed this result.
What is important to note about these changes is that the
code drafters’ standards arguably were not intended to establish a unique normative view that might stand in opposition to
the view of other law-making institutions. Rather, the drafters
either followed changes in legal standards already in progress
or anticipated that the law would change. Viewed fairly, code
provisions adopted for these reasons should not inhibit lawmakers from later departing from the code drafters’ formulation, either because the drafters misunderstood how the law
was evolving or because further change seems desirable.
This situation arguably differs from one in which legal
standards for lawyer behavior are clear and established, yet fail
to specify behavior for particular circumstances. The law of attorney-client privilege, for example, encompasses lawyers’ obligations to maintain client secrets and to disclose limited categories of information, but it applies only in litigation.172 It does
not tell lawyers how to act when possessed of secrets they
would like to disclose for moral reasons, but which have not
been demanded in testimony or discovery. Attorney-client confidentiality rules fill that gap. The future harm exceptions to
confidentiality arguably require lawyers to balance and consider factors that are pertinent to disclosure in the nonlitigation setting.173
170. See Nix, 475 U.S. at 171 (finding professional standards allowing the
disclosure of client perjury to be “reasonable” and constitutional).
171. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Lying Clients: An Age Old Problem, 26 LITIGATION 19, 23 (1999) (categorizing Tennessee as an example of a state that
adopted the ABA’s view, New York as “adher[ing] to the [ABA’s] earlier position,” and Florida as “tak[ing] a more demanding view than the ABA”); cf.
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof ’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 87-353 (1987), in
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY ANTHOLOGY 65 (Thomas Metzloff ed., 1994)
(revising the ABA’s position on lawyers’ obligations in light of the new Model
Rules).
172. See Zacharias, Harmonizing Privilege and Confidentiality, supra note
125, at 71.
173. Lawyers thus may consider the likelihood and extent of the harm the
client will cause, but may also consider such factors as the need for disclosure,
the effect disclosure will have on the lawyer’s relationship with the client, and
the impact on the legal system (in particular, on other clients’ willingness to
trust lawyers) if the disclosure is publicized. See Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351, 358–62 (1988) (discussing the justifications for maintaining strict confidentiality).
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When code drafters fill gaps in the law, their intentions
typically are unclear. The drafters may simply be trying to predict the alternative lawmakers’ preferences, in which case the
code should be deemed subordinate to, and anticipatory of, subsequent decisions by the alternative regulators. It is, however,
equally possible that the code drafters are seeking to influence
subsequent decisions or that they perceive that the alternative
regulators have intentionally left the matter subject to their
control. The resulting ethics provisions may constitute a determination that discretion is an appropriate resolution that all
regulators should accept.
D. SELF-SERVING JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PERMISSIVE RULES
Bar associations rarely advocate the adoption of rules on
the express basis that the rules benefit lawyers (economically
or psychologically) or the bar organization itself. Yet there is
little doubt that ethics codes traditionally have included selfserving propositions.174
Discretionary rules can benefit lawyers financially. Grants
of permission to accept waivers of conflicts of interest can authorize lawyers to accept some lucrative representations that,
on a strict reading of a client’s best interests, the lawyer should
perhaps refuse.175 Rules allowing lawyers to accept cases on a
limited basis176 or to advance expenses177 also facilitate lawyers’ ability to secure business.
Similarly, agency law generally informs lawyers of their obligations to
their principals, including clients. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY
§ 1.01 cmt. e (2006) (“[A]n agent must act loyally in the principal’s interest as
well as on the principal’s behalf. ”). Yet it is silent on whether and how agents
are permitted to consider moral and political factors in advising their principals. Rules like Model Rule 2.1 serve to fill that gap. See, e.g., MODEL RULES
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2006).
174. See Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality II: Is Confidentiality Constitutional?, 75 IOWA L. REV. 601, 628 nn.138–39, 629–30 nn.144–45
(1989) (identifying rules that have been questioned as self-serving).
175. On the surface, when conflict-of-interest rules allow lawyers to accept
client waivers, the rules authorize the representation so long as the rules’ prerequisites are satisfied. An alternative interpretation of the rules is that the
lawyer still may have some obligation to consider systemic interests and the
lawyer’s own fiduciary obligations to the clients in deciding whether to participate. See Zacharias, supra note 88, at 432–33 (discussing the limits of permissible waivers); see also Fred C. Zacharias, Limits on Client Autonomy in
Legal Ethics Regulation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 199, 222 (2001) (discussing the reasons for limiting client autonomy in the conflict-of-interest context).
176. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c) (2006); cf. Fred
C. Zacharias, Limited Performance Agreements: Should Clients Get What They
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The bar organization itself may have self-serving—
typically political—reasons for adopting discretionary rules.
Making conduct permissive often enables the drafters to obtain
consensus concerning a rule that otherwise would not be
adopted by the voting body, because the discretion enables both
proponents and opponents of the conduct in question to continue acting as they prefer. Such a compromise probably accounts for the ABA’s continued reliance on a permissive form of
the harm-prevention exception to attorney-client confidentiality.178 Alternatively, changing mandatory requirements into
permissive standards can be part of a log-rolled package that
enables the drafters of a whole code to secure adoption of other
provisions.179
To the extent one identifies self-interested financial or political motivations for adopting a permissive rule, the code
drafters’ imprimatur on discretion provides little support for
the proposition that other lawmakers should respect the rule. It
is, however, important to distinguish purely self-serving provisions from those that purport to immunize lawyers from discipline or liability on the basis that failing to do so may chill efPay For?, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 915, 946 (1998) (arguing that the ability of
lawyers to limit the scope of representation may be constrained by fiduciary
obligations to clients); Fred C. Zacharias, Reply to Hyman and Silver: Clients
Shouldn’t Get Less Than They Deserve, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 981, 984–85
(1998) (clarifying when lawyers should be limited in their ability to accept limited engagements).
177. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e) (2006).
178. See Kalish, supra note 9, at 656 (explaining that code drafters are often influenced by “politics and lobbying”); Manuel Berrelez et al., Note, Disappearing Dilemmas: Judicial Construction of Ethical Choice as Strategic Behavior in the Criminal Defense Context, 23 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 225, 262 (2005)
(lauding the drafters for attempting to reach “workable compromises” for
moral dilemmas).
179. Code drafters’ political motivations may be at odds with their genuine
normative judgments. Consider, for example, the ABA’s post-Enron adoption
of additional future harm exceptions to address financial misconduct. See
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2)–(3) (2006); Am. Bar Ass’n Task
Force on Corporate Responsibility, supra note 25. For years, the ABA leadership considered and rejected these additions, believing that lawyers should be
required to preserve confidentiality in cases of client fraud. In 2003, however,
the ABA anticipated that unless it adopted a provision permitting lawyers to
report client frauds (under narrow circumstances), the SEC would adopt an
administrative regulation mandating disclosure. See Morgan, supra note 23,
at 15–17. The normative view underlying the rule was probably not that lawyers should sometimes report client fraud or that, as a matter of autonomy,
lawyers should be allowed to do so. Rather, the judgment was simply that, as
between a permissive or mandatory reporting rule, a permissive rule is preferable.
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fective representation. In the latter context, lawyers benefit
from receiving immunity, but the separate interests of clients
or the legal system may justify the benefit.
IV. RAMIFICATIONS FOR CODE DRAFTERS AND
OTHER LAWMAKERS
A. UNCERTAINTY REGARDING THE CODE DRAFTERS’ INTENT
This Article has noted a range of reasons why professional
code drafters might adopt a permissive rule that seems to give
lawyers discretion to determine appropriate conduct. Some of
these reasons reflect a normative judgment that attorney discretion in the covered situation is valuable in its own right. In
reaching that judgment, the code drafters sometimes intend or
anticipate that other lawmakers will respect the grant of discretion, sometimes expect the development of external limitations on the general grant of discretion, and sometimes expect
the grant of discretion to be honored only in particular contexts. With respect to other permissive rules, the justifications
are more practical—sometimes even self-serving—and do not
warrant deference when other regulators consider diverging
from the rules.
Whether particular rules contemplate that external regulators will defer to the code drafters’ judgments often is not clear
from the face of the rules. For example, in adopting discretionary waiver provisions in conflict-of-interest rules, the drafters
of the 1983 Model Rules knew that courts would need to address the same issues in deciding disqualification issues.180 The
drafters may have sought to influence court decisions. Alternatively, they may have anticipated that courts would rely on
their own institutional interests to disqualify lawyers in some
cases even when the conflict rule permits the representation.181
180. See Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts of Interest in the Simultaneous Representation of Multiple Clients: A Proposed Solution to the Current Confusion
and Controversy, 61 TEX. L. REV. 211, 288 (1982) (analyzing the proposed
Model Rules and concluding that it “would be far better to acknowledge the
difficulty of review in some cases and admit that in some of those situations
the enforcement goal must be subordinated to the goal of articulating standards that allow an honest practitioner to make decisions that he believes are
consistent with relevant ethical principles”).
181. The drafters knew that courts would diverge from the rules in the opposite direction. They surely anticipated that courts, for institutional and
practical reasons—including clients’ interest in preserving an ongoing attorney-client relationship—sometimes would not disqualify lawyers even though
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The rules may not even reveal whether they reflect a normative judgment that lawyer autonomy should be respected or
whether the drafters simply were unable to draft a mandatory
rule that captured appropriate distinctions. The rule on moral
and political counseling, for example, might have been intended
to encourage lawyers to provide moral and philosophical perspectives to clients or it might reflect the difficulty of distinguishing cases in which lawyers should be required to give such
counseling from those in which lawyers should be forbidden
from doing so as a matter of competence. Similarly, conflict-ofinterest rules permitting lawyers to accept particular conflict
waivers can be explained in alternate ways.182
This kind of ambiguity presents a conundrum. If external
regulators cannot tell whether a permissive rule contemplates
a universal grant of discretion, how can those regulators decide
whether to defer? In the short run, the only response is that
they must do their best to ascertain the normative judgments
underlying the rule based on its context, drafting history, and
likely effects. In the long run, however, recognizing the existence of alternative justifications for permissive rules has specific implications for how external regulators should proceed.
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR COURTS, LEGISLATURES, AND OTHER
LAWMAKERS CONSIDERING PARALLEL OR SUPPLEMENTAL
REGULATION
When rules of professional conduct give lawyers discretion
to decide how to act, the argument that other lawmakers
should not encroach on that discretion initially seems powerful.
Cynical observers of the professional code-drafting process
might argue that ethics codes are self-serving and that lawmakers should chart their own course; in other words, that the

the mandatory aspects of the conflict rules suggest that a prudent lawyer
should have avoided the representation. See generally Green, supra note 11
(discussing judicial disqualification of counsel in civil cases); Bruce A. Green,
“Through a Glass, Darkly”: How the Court Views Motions to Disqualify Criminal Defense Lawyers, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1201 (1989) (discussing judicial disqualification of counsel in criminal cases).
182. Arguably, for example, Model Rule 1.7 gives primacy to the lawyer’s
business, reputational, and philosophical preferences. Alternatively, it reflects
the difficulty of distinguishing between cases where a lawyer should be allowed to accept or required to continue a representation because clients who
understand the risks will benefit from the particular lawyer’s services and
cases where a lawyer’s refusal of the waiver clearly would be in a client’s best
interest.
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rules are generally biased in favor of lawyer interests over client and third-party interests, and in favor of client interests
over public interests. With respect to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
for example, the ABA amendments to Model Rules 1.6 and 1.13
arguably were a calculated effort to forestall external regulation183 and, as such, deserved no deference from the external
regulators. As a general matter, however, external lawmakers
have not adopted the cynical view. They have tended to value
the codes for several good reasons, including respect for the legal profession’s tradition of self-regulation, respect for state supreme courts that (in most jurisdictions) oversee and adopt the
rules, and a preference for avoiding inconsistent regulation. External lawmakers may defer to permissive rules, in particular,
on the assumption that the rules reflect a reasoned normative
judgment that, for the given categories of conduct, it is wiser
not to draw categorical lines.
Nevertheless, as we have shown, there are reasons why
even a lawmaker who starts from a deferential position should
not hesitate to probe the precedential value of grants of discretion in the codes. The drafters of permissive rules themselves
may not have meant to afford lawyers unfettered discretion.
The drafters may have understood the rules to contain intrinsic
limitations (such as a requirement that discretion be exercised
in light of particular considerations) or as being subject to limitations derived from other rules or extra-code constraints. Under these circumstances, external lawmakers should feel free to
impose restrictions consistent with the limits implicitly incorporated into, or anticipated by, the rules.
Moreover, even a permissive rule that was meant to insulate lawyers from professional discipline does not necessarily
intend to foreclose other lawmakers from reaching supplemental judgments restricting lawyers’ discretion. Some rationales
for permissive rules have implications for other areas of law,
but many do not.
Consider the relationship between the permissive future
harm exceptions to confidentiality and the proposed SEC regulations governing disclosures by corporate attorneys.184 Some
183. See Thomas G. Bost, Corporate Lawyers After the Big Quake: The Conceptual Fault Line in the Professional Duty of Confidentiality, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1089, 1111–12 (2006) (describing ABA decisions designed to “sidetrack” aspects of the federal legislation).
184. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2006) (providing examples of permissive future harm exceptions), with Letter from ABA to
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have argued that the SEC should not adopt a rule requiring
corporate lawyers to report client wrongdoing to the SEC, but
instead should defer to the permissive ethics rules that are in
effect in most states.185 It is far from clear, however, that the
ethics rules provide as much discretion as this argument assumes. Model Rule 4.1 and its state equivalents arguably require lawyers to disclose wrongdoing in many situations potentially covered by the SEC regulations.186 The confidentiality
exceptions also may require lawyers to exercise discretion in a
principled manner that, in at least some cases, points the way
to disclosure. If the SEC is capable of defining when the rules
themselves mandate or anticipate disclosure, the SEC can reasonably adopt regulations putting those definitions into effect
without contradicting the ethics codes. Doing so would clarify
the uncertainty inherent in the future harm provisions themselves, thereby giving greater guidance to lawyers who might
mistakenly believe that the provisions allow unlimited discretion and who, adhering to the ABA’s pre-Enron philosophy, are
disinclined ever to exercise their discretion in favor of reporting.
So what should the SEC do, given the competing arguments? In the absence of better information from the code
drafters, the SEC has little choice but to try to divine the justifications for the confidentiality exceptions from extrinsic evidence and then to determine whether those purposes merit respect. Suppose the SEC initially accepts that the permissive
future harm provisions were intended to grant relatively unbridled discretion. Whether the rationale for that intent is
normative remains uncertain. The permissive provision may
simply reflect a political compromise within the ABA between
those, previously in the majority, who wanted a stronger confidentiality rule, and those who preferred mandatory reporting of
certain client misconduct. If that is the reality, the SEC can
reasonably resolve the dispute.

SEC, supra note 25 (describing the proposed SEC regulations).
185. See, e.g., Letter from Litig. Section of the State Bar of Cal. to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Apr. 4, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/
rules/proposed/s74502/lssbc040403.htm (urging the SEC to defer to permissive
state rules); see also Bost, supra note 183, at 1132–35 (discussing California’s
continuing opposition to the Sarbanes-Oxley rules).
186. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (2006) (declaring that
lawyers “shall not knowingly . . . fail to disclose a material fact when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client”).
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Moreover, even if the SEC agrees with the principles, or
guidance, provided in the codes, it may reasonably diverge from
the discretionary rule because, when evaluating how lawyers
implement the discretion in the SEC’s field of interest, the SEC
finds that lawyers generally do not exercise discretion in accordance with the spirit of the rule.187 Market forces may be so
strong that they prevent securities lawyers from ever disclosing
client misconduct,188 even though the code drafters may sometimes expect disclosure. To the extent the SEC determines that
the normative aspirations have not been, or cannot be, realized
as a practical matter, deference to the rule seems inappropriate.
Insofar as the premises of the permissive confidentiality
exceptions are normative, it also is not clear that the drafters
meant to foreclose the imposition of restrictions by external
lawmakers. The drafters may have concluded that discretion is
preferable in most cases, but that mandatory reporting would
be acceptable in a subset of cases, including certain cases involving misconduct by public corporations. Or, in opting for discretion, the drafters may have overlooked unique considerations relating to the regulation of public companies with which
the SEC has greater concern and expertise—including the importance of enhancing investor confidence in those companies
in the post-Enron world. Although the current opponents of
SEC regulation are able to posit rationales for the permissive
rules that appear to be relevant to the non-disciplinary contexts,189 these may be ex post rationales.
As a historical matter, one cannot be entirely certain why
the SEC has scaled back, and in part deferred, its initial proposals. The SEC may have been persuaded by the argument
that discretion is a preferable regulatory approach in general,
not just for disciplinary purposes. But this Article’s analysis
suggests that the SEC should have weighed those arguments
187. See Peter J. Henning, Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307 and Corporate Counsel: Who Better to Prevent Corporate Crime?, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 323, 382
(2004) (“[T]he real benefit of mandatory complete withdrawal is the leverage it
gives to attorneys who will not look for loopholes but will adhere to the
rules.”).
188. See Fred C. Zacharias, Coercing Clients: Can Lawyer Gatekeeper Rules
Work?, 47 B.C. L. REV. 455, 466–74 (2006) (discussing the incentives of corporate lawyers).
189. Cf. Letter from ABA to SEC, supra note 25 (arguing that certain proposed SEC requirements would undermine corporations’ trust in their lawyers).
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on the merits and should not have relied exclusively on the fact
that the bar itself adopted the permissive approach. If, hypothetically, the SEC found the bar’s premises unpersuasive, the
SEC should not have hesitated, purely out of deference to the
codes, to cut back on the discretion afforded by confidentiality
rules.
It is important to recognize that some forms of lawmaking—such as code drafting and the promulgation of statutes
and administrative rules—are legislative in nature, while others—such as judicial development of liability standards—are
not. When legislative forms are in play, as in the case of the
SEC disclosure proposals, negotiation between the code drafters and other lawmakers is possible.190 This negotiation may be
explicit191 or implicit, through parallel action.192 Indeed, such
negotiation is precisely the process that appears to have developed between the ABA and the SEC regarding their various positions on disclosures by corporate attorneys.193 This Article’s
analysis suggests that the extent of discretion anticipated by
permissive rules is a subject particularly warranting direct attention in such negotiations, lest the expectations of either
regulatory party be unduly discounted or misunderstood.
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR COURTS FILLING OTHER LAW-MAKING
ROLES
Thus far, this Article has focused on external law-making
institutions (including courts, legislatures, and administrative

190. See Fred C. Zacharias, Who Can Best Regulate the Ethics of Federal
Prosecutors, or, Who Should Regulate the Regulators?: Response to Little, 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 429, 460–61 (1996) (discussing negotiations among the ABA,
the Department of Justice, and the courts with respect to the development of
rules against communicating with represented persons and against subpoenaing of attorneys).
191. For example, representatives of the code-drafting body and the administrative agency can meet to discuss issues, provide testimony at each others’
hearings, submit comments, or provide task force reports.
192. The parallel institutions can simply produce parallel legislation on a
step-by-step basis that responds to the legislation of the other body.
193. In other words, the ABA had adopted a rule to which the SEC responded with proposed regulations that would have produced dramatic
change. The ABA countered with a negative task force report and the adoption
of permissive changes to the rules. The SEC then adopted regulations largely
consistent with, but which went slightly further than, the ABA rules, but
which deferred action on its more dramatic proposals. No word has been heard
on the deferred proposals since. For a further description of this history, see
Zacharias, supra note 188, at 457–58.
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agencies) when they are considering promulgating law that
supplements or potentially preempts the ethics codes. Courts,
however, fulfill at least two other relevant law-making functions that merit attention. State supreme courts review and are
responsible for adopting or rejecting code drafters’ proposals,194
including proposals for permissive rules. Trial courts exercise
supervisory authority over lawyers appearing in court, sometimes defining the lawyers’ so-called duties as “officers of the
court.”195 In doing so, trial courts often interpret or build upon
the meaning of the professional rules.
This Article’s analysis suggests that state supreme courts
should pay particular attention to proposals for permissive
rules. As this Article has shown, permissive rules can easily be
misinterpreted as giving lawyers more-than-intended discretion and thus are unusually likely to be self-serving. The supreme courts therefore should take care not to rubber-stamp
them.
A good example is California’s recently-adopted future
crime exception to attorney-client confidentiality. California
lawyers used to be governed by a near absolute confidentiality
provision,196 but were forced to promulgate an exception by legislation mandating a change.197 The code drafters selected a
permissive exception similar to the original version of Model
Rule 1.6(b)(1).198 They made two pertinent changes to the
model rule, however. They added a provision stating that a
lawyer “who does not reveal information permitted [under the
194. See Zacharias & Green, supra note 96, at 1308 (“Most state supreme
courts claim plenary law-making and rule-making authority to regulate the
conduct of lawyers whom they have authorized to practice law.”).
195. Zacharias & Green, supra note 39, at 50, 63.
196. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (West 2003); Fred C. Zacharias,
Privilege and Confidentiality in California, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 367, 372–73
(1995) (discussing the near absolute character of confidentiality in California).
197. Assemb. 1101, 2003 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003), available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/03-04vill/asm/ab_1101-1150/ab1101_bill_
20031011_chaptered.pdf (calling for a task force “to study and make recommendations for a rule of professional conduct regarding professional responsibility issues related to this act”).
198. Compare CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3-100 (2004) (providing
that a lawyer “may, but is not required to,” reveal information necessary to
“prevent a criminal act that the member reasonably believes is likely to result
in death of, or substantial bodily harm to, an individual”), with MODEL RULES
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (1983) (providing that a lawyer “may” reveal
information necessary “to prevent the client from committing a criminal act
that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial
bodily harm”).
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exception] does not violate this rule.”199 They also added a
comment stating that a lawyer is “not subject to discipline for
revealing confidential information as permitted under this
Rule.”200 Together, these changes provided lawyers with absolute immunity from discipline for any choice of conduct, however self-serving.201 In preserving the interests of lawyers, the
drafters may have undermined the legislative intent to produce
at least some disclosures that further the public interest.
Unlike the state supreme courts, which can actually reject
or rewrite proposed rules, trial courts have only implementation power. They supervise the conduct of litigators on a day-today basis. This role requires them to oversee conflicts of interest, disputes between lawyers and clients (e.g., about fees and
advice lawyers have, or have not, given clients), disclosures
that lawyers might wish to make or refuse to make, and other
activities that are initially governed by permissive ethics
rules.202 Issues within these subject matters involving the limits, if any, to lawyer discretion and the obligations of lawyers as
officers of the court are not often addressed in appellate decisions because the issues tend to be procedural in nature and
the conduct in question generally occurs outside the courtroom.
When the permissive rules are unclear, supervisory courts
serve a useful function in spelling out their meaning.203 It may
be uniquely important for trial courts to write opinions that
provide guidance concerning the nature of lawyers’ discretion.
D. IMPLICATIONS FOR CODE DRAFTERS
This Article has highlighted several aspects of code drafting that lawyers and the drafters themselves may not sufficiently have acknowledged. Not all discretionary professional
rules are the same. Even on their own terms, permissive rules
authorize varying degrees of discretion. Other lawmakers
199. CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3-100(E) (2004).
200. Id. R. 3-100 discussion.
201. The only legal restraints that appear to remain are the potential for
civil Tarasoff liability for failure to disclose and independent malpractice liability for excessive disclosure. See Zacharias, supra note 196, at 402–03 (discussing Tarasoff liability). Lawyers will undoubtedly argue that the permissive professional rule was intended to immunize them from such liability,
leaving courts to assess that argument.
202. See, e.g., McClure v. Thompson, 323 F.3d 1233, 1242 (9th Cir. 2003)
(interpreting the future crime exception to attorney-client confidentiality).
203. See Zacharias & Green, supra note 39, at 39–41 (discussing judicial
supplementation of ethics rules).
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sometimes may have reasons to accept the permissive standards outside the disciplinary context and sometimes should
feel free to chart their own course.
These practical realities have significant ramifications for
code drafters. Lawyers, by training, are most likely to read
their professional obligations in the same way they read statutes and other legal rules.204 Many will view the codes as a collection of rules proscribing and allowing specific conduct that
creative lawyers should try to circumvent (within the bounds of
the law) in their own and their clients’ interests. One of the
goals of the professional codes is to guide lawyers,205 so it becomes especially important for discretionary rules to identify
how the code drafters expect discretion to be exercised and
whether that discretion is limited in scope. Thus, for example,
to the extent that the drafters envision lawyers implementing
discretionary confidentiality exceptions with a view to the competing client, systemic, and third-party interests rather than
the lawyers’ own (or exclusively the clients’) interests, the code
drafters can note that fact and suggest methods by which the
competing considerations can be balanced.206
The above discussion also highlights the reality that code
drafters do not always, or necessarily, adopt permissive rules
204. Cf. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J.
1239, 1249–60 (1991) (discussing the apparent increase in legalization of ethics codes over time).
205. See Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Codes, supra note 8, at 257–
65 (discussing the codes’ guidance function).
206. See Zacharias, Harmonizing Privilege and Confidentiality, supra note
125, at 108–09 (discussing guidance that code drafters might provide with respect to discretionary attorney-client confidentiality exceptions). The guidance
currently provided by the Model Rules is minimal at best. See MODEL RULES
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 15 (2006) (“In exercising the discretion conferred by this Rule, the lawyer may consider such factors as the nature of the
lawyer’s relationship with the client . . . , the lawyer’s own involvement in the
transaction and factors that may extenuate the conduct in question.”). Other
ethics codes, such as New York’s Code of Professional Responsibility, provide
slightly more guidance and in more emphatic terms:
In exercising this discretion [to report a client’s intended crime], however, the lawyer should consider such factors as the seriousness of the
potential injury to others if the prospective crime is committed, the
likelihood that it will be committed and its imminence, the apparent
absence of any other feasible way in which the potential injury can be
prevented, the extent to which the client may have attempted to involve the lawyer in the prospective crime, the circumstances under
which the lawyer acquired the information of the client’s intent, and
any other possibly aggravating or extenuating circumstances.
N.Y. CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-7 (2006).
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hoping to influence or control alternative regulators. The mere
fact that an ethics rule expresses a normative judgment that
lawyers should be allowed to exercise discretion for disciplinary
purposes does not signify that the drafters intended to foreclose
complementary, supplemental, or even contradictory regulation.
At times, the drafters may intend to establish discretion as
a regulatory norm, fully expecting or hoping that courts and
other law-making institutions will accept their approach.207
That intent was apparent in 2003 when the ABA added exceptions to the confidentiality rule permitting lawyers to disclose
confidences in limited circumstances to prevent certain client
harms and wrongdoing.208 The ABA anticipated impending
administrative regulation that threatened to make disclosure
mandatory (and, in the ABA’s view, might have undermined
lawyer-client relationships).209 When, as in this case, the code
drafters believe that other lawmakers should not encroach on
lawyers’ discretion, they should say so, rather than preserve
the fiction that the ethics rules are drafted without regard to
how other lawmakers will view them.210 Otherwise, faced with
ambiguity regarding the purposes of permissive rules, external
regulators will justifiably feel free to ignore them.
Occasionally, code drafters have deliberately adopted permissive rules in the teeth of existing law that deprives lawyers
of discretion. In pursuing this course, the drafters may simply
believe strongly in their normative vision and hope to influence
the other institutions to cede the point or take it into serious
consideration when adopting supplemental regulation. Alternatively, they may be prepared to live with clashing standards,
either (1) to make a strong point that they fully expect to lose
or (2) because the code and alternative standards have force in
independent spheres, and the drafters are unwilling to employ
the disciplinary rules to reinforce a legal standard with which
207. See Koniak, supra note 125, at 1411.
208. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2)–(3) (2003) (allowing disclosure of confidences to avert financial harms when a client misuses
the lawyer’s services); id. R. 1.13(c) (allowing lawyers to reveal information
under limited circumstances when necessary to prevent injury to an organizational client).
209. See, e.g., Morgan, supra note 23, at 15–17 (noting that the ABA Task
Force’s decision to amend the Model Rules after the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was partly influenced by Senator Edwards’ proposal that the
SEC promulgate rules relating to professional conduct).
210. See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text.
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they disagree. By adopting a conflicting approach, the drafters
essentially signal that, with respect to this particular subject
matter, lawyer-regulators are better able to judge how the
competing public policies—protecting third-party interests versus protecting attorney-client relationships, or the importance
of aggressive advocacy to the system versus judicial economy—
should be resolved.
This approach is a challenge to external regulators. Again,
it is one that is better made explicitly. Unless the other lawmakers are told that the bar claims superior judgment in this
area and are educated about the reason for that superiority,
they are unlikely to assess the bar’s claim and take it into account. After all, the codes themselves deny any intent to influence substantive law.211 An alternative explanation for the
drafters’ positions usually will exist.
In short, once code drafters acknowledge that some justifications for discretionary rules do not support immunity standards for lawyers in other contexts and that external regulators
have a role to play in setting alternative or supplemental standards, it becomes important that code drafters identify their
expectations for particular permissive rules. One might anticipate that bar association drafters, who are aligned with members of the profession, will try to protect the membership by
positing that all, or most, permissive rules justify immunity
standards. But that is where the participation of the supervising state supreme courts becomes important. Although the
courts often rubber-stamp bar proposals,212 they have a particular interest in the demarcation of lawyer discretion. If the bar
fails to present permissive rules honestly, the courts are likely
to intervene.213
211. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 20 (2006); MODEL
CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY pmbl. (1980).
212. See Zacharias, supra note 101, at 375 n.180 (“Courts or the legislature
ordinarily rubber-stamp professional codes that have been drafted behind
closed doors by a select group of the profession itself.”).
213. Increased participation by the courts at the rule-making stage probably would be a valuable development in any event. See Ted Schneyer, Legal
Process Scholarship and the Regulation of Lawyers, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 33,
41 (1996) (“The view that legislatures and executive-branch agencies are better occupational rulemakers than either the judiciary or a peak professional
association, however sound as a generalization, is not necessarily sound when
it comes to setting standards for law practice. The judiciary’s expertise, its interest in the integrity of the legal process, and its legitimate need for independence from the ‘political’ branches must be considered.”); cf. Benjamin H.
Barton, An Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who Should Control
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CONCLUSION
On the surface, the permissive ethics rules seem simple:
they give lawyers a choice. This Article has demonstrated that
this appearance is deceptive. From the face of most permissive
rules, it is not clear how much of a choice the rules mean to accord lawyers or what the effect of that choice should be—on potential discipline and, more importantly, on the judgment of
other lawmakers considering the same conduct.
This analysis has important implications for lawyers, code
drafters, and the alternative regulators. The beguiling simplicity of the codes’ permissive provisions creates a significant risk
both that lawyers will overemphasize their discretion and that
the various regulators will misunderstand the import of the
rules. In the short run, this risk calls for greater care on the
part of regulators implementing or responding to the rules. In
the long run, the permissive rules must become more transparent—an eventuality that calls for greater clarity by the drafters
and increased scrutiny by supervisory courts. This Article’s distillation of the complexities of the permissive rules provides a
foundation upon which the subsequent analysis should build.

Lawyer Regulation—Courts, Legislatures, or the Market?, 37 GA. L. REV. 1167,
1188 (2003) (“[A]lthough there may be excellent reasons to favor courts as adjudicators, when regulating lawyers state supreme courts act as legislators,
they are not as independent or free from self-interest in that role.”); Wilkins,
supra note 5, at 887 (discussing the attributes of various policymakers in the
enforcement of professional standards).

